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Introduction 
 
 
 
This doctoral thesis is made of three empirical research papers focused on executive 
compensation topics. The first chapter is a solo paper, while the second and third papers are 
co-authored with Antonio Parbonetti.  
Executive compensation has become an internationally debated topic which attracted 
the interest of both academics and practitioners. In fact, the escalation in top executive pay 
and the perception that high salaries are not always coupled with outstanding performances 
(Murphy, 1999), have fueled an increasing interest in understanding the determinants and 
effects of incentives provided to top executives.   
From a theoretical standpoint, executive compensation literature builds on agency 
theory, which provides the appropriate framework for examining the link between 
information systems, incentives, and behaviors. Agency relationships occur when one partner 
in a transaction (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent) and the welfare of 
the principal is affected by the choices of the agent. Agency theory assumes that agents are 
self-interested and may attempt to maximize their interests at the expense of the principal. 
Compensation contracts are a pivotal tool used by principals to mitigate agency problems 
since they are designed in such a way to provide agents with incentives to act in the best 
interest of the principal.  
Accounting scholars are interested in executive compensation from many 
perspectives, as summarized in Figure 1.  
First, accounting discipline has analyzed executive compensation as a corporate 
governance tool (Link 1). In fact, setting top executive pay is an important task of the board of 
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directors, and many scholars investigated boards’ effectiveness in providing executives with 
the appropriate level of incentives (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). Other scholars, instead, 
investigated the relationship between board’s characteristics and CEO compensation (Kren  
and Kerr, 1997) or the effect of executive compensation on firm’s value, future performance 
and investment decisions (Bens et al., 2002; Hanlon et al., 2003; Larcker et al., 2007).  
 
Corporate Governance Tool
Accounting Measures in 
Compensation Contracts Accounting Decisions
• Board characteristics and 
compensation
• Executive compensation and 
firm’s performance
• Earnings management
• Tax avoidance
• Accounting Fraud
• Accounting earnings in 
compensation contracts
• Nonfinancial performance 
measures in executives’ 
bonuses
Executive Compensation
Link 1
Link 2 Link 3
 
Figure 1. Accounting Research and Executive Compensation 
 
Second, accounting scholars are interested in executive compensation because accounting 
measures can enter the design of compensation contracts (Link 2). In this line, researchers 
analyzed the use of accounting earnings in executives’ contracts (Lambert  and Larcker, 1987; 
Sloan, 1993), as well as the role of nonfinancial performance measures in executive 
compensation (Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997). Moreover, a wide research stream in 
management accounting literature investigated from this perspective the structure of 
executives’ incentive schemes (Nagar, 2002). Specifically, this literature deals with the 
stewardship role of accounting: investors delegate decision making to managers and thus 
there is a demand for information about the actions that are taken for the purpose of 
controlling them (see Gjesdal, 1981). 
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Third, accounting is interested in executive compensation because the structure of 
compensation contracts can affect executives’ accounting and reporting choices (Link 3).  
This is, probably, the most developed research stream in accounting literature within the 
executive compensation topics. Accounting choices that have been investigated in the 
literature as a consequence of executive compensation include: earnings management (Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006); corporate voluntary disclosure 
(Aboody and Kasznik, 2000); stock options’ backdating (Heron and Lie, 2007); tax avoidance 
(Phillips, 2003); accounting fraud (Erickson et al., 2006); voluntary recognition of stock-
based compensation expense (Aboody  et al., 2004), just to name a few. 
The three chapters of this thesis fit into this broad research framework and aim at 
empirically addressing three different research questions with reference to executive 
compensation. 
 The first chapter examines the first link of Figure 1, and answer to Bushman and 
Smith’s (2001) call for research on compensation of executives other than CEOs. 
Specifically, using a sample of 586 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2009, I 
investigate the economic determinants and effects on shareholder value of the equity 
incentives given to the Chief Marketing Officer (CMO). The paper shows that, when 
companies invest more in marketing activities, they also give the CMO more equity 
incentives. I also find that CMOs’ equity incentives are positively related to shareholder value 
and that this positive relationship is incremental to that between CEOs’ incentives and firm 
value. Finally, I document that the positive impact of CMOs’ equity incentives on firm value 
is not limited to those firms that invest more than the industry average in marketing, 
suggesting a strategic role for the CMO that is not linked only to the size of the marketing 
budget. These findings, which help to advance our understanding of the determinants and 
effects of executive compensation, have considerable practical implications. Specifically, I 
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challenge the mainstream view that the CEO’s compensation captures all first-order effects 
and that the consequences of the compensation structure of executives other than the CEO are 
negligible. In fact, I document that the Chief Marketing Officer plays a central role in 
delivering shareholder value when she is properly incentivized. I also show that companies do 
not simply rescale the CEO’s incentives when they decide how to incent the CMO, but they 
take a proactive role in detecting other economic determinants in order to set the appropriate 
level of incentives. Therefore, findings reported in the paper warn companies not to focus 
only on setting the CEO’s incentives, while neglecting to incent other key top executives such 
as the CMO. 
The second chapter, instead, examines the third link of Figure 1, and analyzes how 
CEO’s equity incentives, risk incentives and career concerns drive the trade-off among 
earnings game strategies. Accounting literature documented that managers, in order to meet 
earnings targets, may engage in the numbers game by making choices among three non 
mutually exclusive strategies. Specifically, executives can alter reported earnings through 
real or accrual earnings management, and/or guide analysts’ expectations downward in an 
attempt of avoiding negative earnings surprises. Previous literature showed that stricter 
regulation (i.e. the passage of the SOX), and firm’s specific characteristics, influence the 
relative costliness of each earnings game strategy (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). 
Nonetheless, literature fails to recognize that earnings game strategies are decided and 
executed by the CEO, who is going to consider, in the choice of how meeting/beating targets, 
also her personal costs and benefits. Using a sample of 4,471 quarterly observations, from 
1,088 U.S. firms that are likely to have engaged in the earnings game over the period 2003-
20010, I show that CEOs trade off the different earnings game strategies according to their 
personal benefits and costs. Specifically, I find that CEOs with high equity incentives and 
high career concerns engage less in real activity manipulations than executives with low 
vii 
 
incentives, and substitute this earnings game strategy with other alternatives. Additionally, I 
document that firms using real activity manipulation to meet/beat targets have lower future 
market performances than firms using accrual earnings management or analysts’ guidance. 
This result indicates that earnings game strategies that mostly rely on the alteration of real 
activities, impose very high costs on shareholders. CEOs appear to understand and anticipate 
this effect and, when their interests are aligned with those of shareholders in terms of equity 
incentives and career concerns, they avoid to choose real earnings management strategies. 
Overall, this chapter contributes to a well established research stream such as earnings 
management, by analyzing the trade-off among earnings game strategies from a new 
prospective.  
Finally, the last chapter still examines the third link in Figure 1, but focuses the 
attention on CEO’s compensation in the financial industry, which has attracted an increasing 
interest in recent years. In fact, executive compensation has been blamed of being one of the 
most fundamental causes of the recent credit crisis, providing CEOs with incentives to take 
too many big bets that turned out to be extremely costly (Solomon and Paletta, 2009). 
Specifically, the paper investigates the role of CEO’s equity and risk incentives in boosting 
securitizations in the financial industry and in motivating executives to reduce the perceived 
risk while betting on it. Using a sample of US financial institutions over the period 2003-
2009, the paper documents that CEOs with high equity incentives have systematically 
engaged in securitization transactions to a larger extent than CEOs with low incentives. It also 
shows that CEOs with high equity and risk-related incentives engaged in risky securitization 
activities and used securitization for transferring risks to outside investors. Finally, the paper 
shows that executives incentivized on risk provided outside investors with low quality 
disclosure about losses recorded on securitized loans, thus contributing to increase the opacity 
of securitization transactions undertaken. Overall, I interpret these results as evidence that 
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CEOs foresaw in securitizations under US GAAP an opportunity for hiding risks while 
bearing them and generating profits and cash flows because of the risks. In additional 
analyses, I document that before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 2007, 
financial institutions involved in the securitization of subprime loans largely over performed 
other banks in terms of market returns and earnings. On the contrary, starting from 2007 
subprime securitizers have recorded worse performances than other financial institutions that 
were not involved in subprime securitization. This indicates that, by securitizing risky loans, 
CEOs were successful in boosting stock price and earnings, but the risks undertaken turned 
out to be extremely costly. This paper, therefore, adds to the large stream of research warning 
about possible side effects of equity compensation, and uncovers a determinant of 
securitization transactions that has been overlooked by previous literature.  
Overall the three research papers included in this doctoral thesis address unexplored 
topics in executive compensation and aim at contributing to the current debate about the 
determinants and effects top executive compensation structure.   
ix 
 
Introduzione 
 
 
 
Il presente lavoro è costituito da tre articoli accademici, di natura empirica, focalizzati sul 
tema della remunerazione dei manager. Il primo capitolo è un paper a firma unica, mentre il 
secondo e terzo paper sono co-autorati con Antonio Parbonetti. 
 Il tema della remunerazione dei manager sta attraendo un crescente interesse nella 
comunità accademica e tra le imprese poiché il forte aumento dei livelli di remunerazione, e 
la percezione che tali incrementi spesso non siano seguiti da altrettanto eccellenti 
performance, stimolano sempre più a comprendere le determinanti e gli effetti degli incentivi 
forniti ai top executive. 
 Da un punto di vista teorico, la letteratura sul tema della remunerazione dei manager si 
fonda sulla teoria dell’agenzia, che fornisce l’appropriato schema teorico di riferimento per 
analizzare le relazioni tra informazioni, incentivi e comportamenti. Le relazioni di agenzia 
emergono quando, in una transazione, un soggetto (il principale) delega autorità ad un altro 
soggetto (l’agente), e l’utilità del principale è influenzata dalle scelte dell’agente. La teoria 
dell’agenzia assume che l’agente persegua i propri interessi personali e possa massimizzare la 
propria funzione di utilità a discapito del principale. I contratti di remunerazione sono, quindi, 
uno strumento fondamentale per alleviare i problemi di agenzia, poiché essi sono disegnati in 
modo tale da allineare gli interessi dell’agente con quelli del principale. 
 Gli studiosi di accounting sono interessati ai temi legati alla remunerazione dei 
manager da diverse prospettive, come illustrato in Figura 1. 
 In primo luogo, la letteratura di accounting ha analizzato la remunerazione dei 
manager come strumento di governance (Legame 1). Infatti, la determinazione delle politiche 
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di remunerazione dei top manager è uno dei principali compiti del consiglio di 
amministrazione (board), e diversi autori hanno analizzato la capacità del board di fornire ai 
manager livelli appropriati di incentivi (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). Altri studiosi, invece, 
si sono focalizzati i) sulla relazione tra caratteristiche del consiglio di amministrazione e 
schemi di incentivazione dei manager (Kren  and Kerr, 1997), e ii) sugli effetti della struttura 
di remunerazione degli executive sul valore aziendale, sulla performance futura e sulle 
decisioni aziendali di investimento (Bens et al., 2002; Hanlon et al., 2003; Larcker et al., 
2007). 
 
Strumento di Corporate 
Governance
Utilizzo di Misure di
Accounting nei Contratti Decisioni di Accounting
• Caratteristiche del consiglio di
amministrazione e 
remunerazione dei manager
• Strutture di remunerazione e 
performance aziendali
• Manipolazioni contabili
• Elusione fiscale
• Frodi
• Utilizzo di misure 
finanziarie e non-finanziarie 
nei contratti con i manager
Remunerazione dei Manager
Legame 1
Legame 2 Legame 3
 
Figura 1. Accounting e Remunerazione dei Manager 
  
In secondo luogo, gli studiosi di accounting si occupano di temi legati alla 
remunerazione dei manager perché le misure contabili sono elemento centrale dei contratti 
stessi (Legame 2). Diversi autori, pertanto, hanno analizzato il ruolo delle misure contabili nei 
contratti degli executive  (Lambert  and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993), ma hanno anche 
approfondito l’utilizzo di misure non finanziare negli schemi di incentivazione (Bushman et 
al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997). Inoltre, un’ampia letteratura in management accounting ha 
analizzato da questa prospettiva la struttura di incentivazione dei manager (Nagar, 2002). In 
xi 
 
particolare, in questo contesto diventa rilevante il ruolo di stewardship dell’accounting: gli 
investitori delegano il processo decisionale ai manager e pertanto necessitano di informazioni 
riguardo le azioni intraprese da quest’ultimi per controllarli. 
 Infine, la struttura di remunerazione dei manager può influenzare le decisioni 
di accounting (Legame 3). Questo filone di ricerca è probabilmente il più sviluppato nella 
disciplina di accounting avente a riferimento le tematiche della remunerazione degli 
executive. Le scelte di accounting che sono state studiate in letteratura come possibili 
conseguenze della struttura di remunerazione dei manager sono: manipolazione degli utili 
contabili (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006); disclosure volontaria 
(Aboody and Kasznik, 2000), retrodatazione delle opzioni (Heron and Lie, 2007); elusione 
fiscale (Phillips, 2003); frodi contabili (Erickson et al., 2006); contabilizzazione delle opzioni 
(Aboody  et al., 2004). 
I tre capitoli del presente lavoro di tesi sono contestualizzati nell’ambito del quadro 
teorico appena descritto e mirano ad analizzare empiricamente tre distinte domande di ricerca 
inerenti al tema della remunerazione dei manager. 
Il primo capitolo esamina il primo legame illustrato in Figura 1, e cerca di colmare 
parte del vuoto presente in letteratura andando ad analizzare la remunerazione di manager 
diversi dall’amministratore delegato (CEO), come suggerito da Bushman and Smith’s (2001). 
In particolare, utilizzando un campione di 586 osservazioni dal 2000 al 2009, lo studio 
analizza le determinanti economiche e gli effetti sul valore aziendale degli incentivi azionari 
forniti al Direttore Marketing (Chief Marketing Officer, CMO). I risultati mostrano che, 
quando le aziende investono maggiormente in marketing, forniscono al CMO maggiori 
incentivi azionari. Inoltre, lo studio rivela che gli incentivi azionari forniti al CMO sono 
positivamente correlati al valore aziendale e che tale effetto è incrementale rispetto a quello 
dovuto agli incentivi monetari del CEO. Infine, il capitolo rivela che l’impatto positivo sul 
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valore aziendale riconducibile agli incentivi azionari del CMO non è limitato esclusivamente 
alle aziende con elevati investimenti di marketing. Questo suggerisce che il CMO riveste un 
ruolo strategico nell’azienda che non è esclusivamente legato all’entità del budget di 
marketing. I risultati riportati nello studio hanno considerevoli implicazioni pratiche. In 
particolare, essi sono in contrapposizione con la tradizionale percezione che la remunerazione 
del CEO catturi tutti gli effetti rilevanti e che, quindi, sia di marginale importanza studiare la 
struttura di incentivazione di executive diversi dal CEO. Infatti, lo studio documenta che il 
CMO, quando propriamente incentivato, riveste un ruolo strategico chiave nel creare valore 
aziendale. Inoltre, i risultati suggeriscono che le aziende, nel determinare gli incentivi dei 
manager diversi dal CEO, non ridimensionano semplicemente la struttura di remunerazione 
dell’amministratore delegato, bensì cercano di identificare delle determinanti economiche 
rilevanti per definire l’appropriato livello di incentivi.  
Il secondo capitolo, invece, si focalizza sul terzo legame rappresentato in Figura 1, e 
analizza come gli incentivi azionari, gli incentivi al rischio e i career concern del CEO 
influiscono sul trade-off tra le diverse strategie di earnings management. La letteratura di 
accounting ha documentato che, al fine di raggiungere determinati obiettivi di performance, i 
manager possono scegliere di 1) manipolare gli utili contabili utilizzando la flessibilità 
concessa dai principi contabili (accrual-based earnings management), 2) manipolare le 
decisioni di investimento dell’azienda (real earnings management), 3) abbassare le 
aspettative degli analisti per evitare di non raggiungere le loro stime (analysts’ expectation 
guidance). La letteratura ha mostrato che una regolamentazione più severa, e caratteristiche 
intrinseche dell’impresa, influenzano il costo delle menzionate strategie di earnings game 
(Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Tuttavia, non si è prestata la dovuta attenzione al fatto che 
la scelta della strategia di earnings game da utilizzare viene effettuata, in ultima istanza, dal 
CEO dell’azienda il quale considererà nella scelta anche i propri incentivi. Utilizzando un 
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campione di 4,471 osservazioni dal 2003 al 2010, il secondo capitolo mostra che il CEO 
sceglie quale strategia di earnings game utilizzare anche in funzione di costi e benefici 
personali. In particolare, i risultati indicano che i CEO con maggiori incentivi azionari e con 
più elevati career concern, utilizzano di meno le strategie di real earnings management e le 
sostituiscono con le altre due alternative. Inoltre, lo studio mostra che le aziende che 
utilizzano in misura maggiore il real earnings management registrano performance future di 
mercato significativamente inferiori a quelle aziende che invece utilizzano altre strategie di 
earnings game. Tale risultato suggerisce che quando i manager manipolano le decisioni di 
investimento dell’azienda, al solo fine di raggiungere alcuni target di performance, 
impongono alti costi agli azionisti. I manager sembrano comprendere ed anticipare questo 
effetto e, quando i loro interessi sono maggiormente allineati con quelli degli azionisti in 
termini di incentivi azionari e career concern, utilizzano in misura minore le strategie di real 
earnings management. In conclusione, il secondo capitolo contribuisce ad un filone di ricerca 
già ben sviluppato andando ad analizzare il trade-off tra le strategie di earnings game da una 
nuova prospettiva: quella dei manager. 
Infine, l’ultimo capitolo continua ad esplorare il Legame 3 della Figura 1, ma si 
focalizza sulla struttura di remunerazione del CEO nel settore finanziario; tematica 
quest’ultima particolarmente dibattuta negli ultimi anni. Infatti, la struttura di remunerazione 
degli executive nel settore finanziario è stata accusata di essere una delle principali cause 
della recente crisi finanziaria, poiché avrebbe fornito ai manager incentivi ad assumere 
eccessivi rischi (Solomon and Paletta, 2009). In particolare, il capitolo analizza il ruolo degli 
incentivi azionari e degli incentivi al rischio nel motivare i CEO ad intraprendere operazioni 
di cartolarizzazione dei mutui, riducendo i rischi percepiti dagli investitori esterni ma, al 
contempo, scommettendo su di essi. Utilizzando un campione di istituzioni finanziarie 
statunitensi dal 2003 al 2009, lo studio documenta che i manager con elevati incentivi 
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azionari hanno sistematicamente cartolarizzato una quantità maggiore di mutui. I risultati 
indicano altresì che i manager con elevati incentivi azionari ed incentivi al rischio, sono stati 
maggiormente coinvolti in operazioni di cartolarizzazione di mutui subprime, utilizzando in 
tal modo lo strumento della cartolarizzazione per trasferire i rischi ad investitori esterni. 
Inoltre, lo studio documenta che i manager incentivati al rischio hanno fornito una disclosure 
di qualità peggiore agli investitori esterni ed hanno pertanto contribuito ad aumentare le 
asimmetrie informative. Nel complesso, le analisi svolte suggeriscono che i manager hanno 
intravisto nelle operazioni di cartolarizzazione dei mutui la possibilità di nascondere i rischi 
generati ed incrementare i profitti delle proprie istituzioni finanziarie. In analisi aggiuntive, il 
capitolo mostra che, prima del crollo del mercato dei mutui subprime avvenuto nel 2007, le 
istituzioni finanziare coinvolte nella cartolarizzazione dei mutui subprime hanno registrato 
performance significativamente superiori ai propri concorrenti. Tuttavia, una volta che la crisi 
finanziaria è emersa, tali istituzioni ne hanno subito le conseguenze in misura maggiore. 
Pertanto, i risultati  suggeriscono che, grazie alla cartolarizzazione dei mutui subprime, i 
manager delle grandi istituzioni finanziarie statunitensi hanno avuto successo 
nell’incrementare i profitti delle proprie istituzioni; tuttavia ciò è avvenuto assumendo rischi 
eccessivamente elevati. Il capitolo, pertanto, contribuisce all’ampio dibattito in letteratura 
riguardo ai potenziali effetti distorsivi causati dalla struttura di remunerazione dei manager. 
In conclusione, i tre articoli accademici che costituiscono la presente tesi di dottorato 
analizzano tre domande di ricerca attualmente inesplorate in letteratura e contribuiscono ad 
alimentare il dibattito sulle determinanti e sugli effetti della struttura di remunerazione dei 
manager.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Chief Marketing Officer’s Equity Incentives:  
Economic Determinants and Effects on 
Shareholder Value 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Many scholars have investigated the composition of top executive compensation and have 
studied how different structures of executive compensation influence firms’ performance and 
value (Core et al., 2003; Fong, 2009; Hogan and Lewis, 2005; Murphy, 1985; Murphy, 1999; 
Wallace, 1997). Most contributions in the literature focus on the chief executive officer 
(CEO) because of the underlying assumption that studying CEO’s compensation clarifies all 
first-order effects. This viewpoint has been challenged by a few studies (e.g., Bushman et al., 
1995; Indjejikian and Matejka, 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011) that investigate the 
compensation structure of some non-CEO executives, such as the chief financial officer 
(CFO). This paper examines the economic determinants and the effects on the firm’s value of 
the compensation structure of the chief marketing officer (CMO), a top executive that, to the 
best of my knowledge, has never been studied. The marketing literature has documented 
theoretically (Srivastava et al., 1998; Srivastava et al., 1999) and empirically (Srinivasan and 
Hanssens, 2009) a strong and positive relationship between marketing activities and 
shareholder value. As a consequence, the CMO, who is in charge of managing all variables 
related to the marketing mix, is likely to play a central role in influencing the firm’s 
performance. Therefore, I argue that considering the CMO’s compensation  is essential to 
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developing a complete picture of the effects of executive compensation on the firm’s value. In 
fact, although there is a large body of literature that suggests the importance of marketing 
activities and processes in sustaining and creating firm’s value, we know nothing about how 
the top executive in charge of managing these activities is incented. The purpose of this paper 
is to fill this gap by focusing on the equity incentives that have become executives’ most 
important compensation component (Core et al., 2003). Using a sample of 586 firm-year 
observations over the period 2000-2009 and a two-stage Heckman model approach, the paper 
documents three important features of CMO’s compensation. First, when a firm’s marketing 
intensity increases, the CMO’s equity incentives significantly increase. Second, CMO’s 
equity incentives are positively related to shareholder value, and this positive relationship is 
incremental to that between the CEO’s incentives and firm’s value. Third, the positive impact 
of the CMO’s equity incentives on the firm’s value is not limited to firms that invest in 
marketing more than the industry average, which finding suggests a strategic role for the 
CMO that is not simply linked to managing the marketing budget. These results suggest that 
the CMO’s compensation structure cannot be considered only a second-order effect, and its 
effects on the firm’s value deserves to be analyzed: specifically, moving from the first to the 
second quartile of CMOs’ equity incentives, the average Tobin’s q increases by 7 percent. 
This effect is economically significant but is not too high to appear unrealistic. More 
important, this result is incremental to the positive effect of CEO’s equity incentives on the 
firm’s value that the literature has already documented.  
This paper contributes to extant literature in several ways. First, it adds to the traditional 
research stream that investigates executive compensation and equity incentives. To the best of 
my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the structure and effect on value of the 
CMO’s compensation in answer to Bushman and Smith’s (2001) call for research on 
compensation of executives other than CEOs. Second, the paper adds to the literature that 
investigates the role of marketing in delivering shareholder value: given the established link 
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between marketing activities and shareholder value, the paper explores the effect on firm 
value of the incentives provided to the executive in charge of managing marketing processes. 
This paper is also linked to Nath and Mahajan’s (2008) study, which investigates the effect on 
performance of the CMO’s being in the top management team. Nath and Mahajan (2008) find 
no support for the hypothesis that the CMO’s being in the top management team improves 
corporate performance, but by moving the focus of the analysis from the mere 
presence/absence of the CMO in the top management team to the CMO’s compensation 
structure, I find strong support for the CMO’s strategic role in the company. Finally, by 
showing that the positive effect on value of the CMO’s equity incentives is not conditioned on 
the firm’s marketing investments, this paper also supports the idea that marketing has a 
strategic role that goes well beyond simply organizing marketing campaigns and market 
research, so it provides support for the idea that marketing strategically contributes to the 
planning process and to the creation of market-based assets (Anderson, 1982; Srivastava et 
al., 1998). 
  
1.2 Motivation and Related Literature  
Equity incentives are among the mechanisms companies use most frequently to alleviate 
agency problems between managers and shareholders (Core et al., 2003; Lambert, 2001; 
Murphy, 1999). Equity incentives, which increase in value when the firm’s stock price rises, 
are designed to incent managers to work to increase the stock price. Many studies have 
investigated the relationship between the level of executives’ equity incentives and firm 
performance, but results are diverse (Core et al., 2003). Some authors (e.g., Frye, 2004; 
Hanlon et al., 2003; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988) document a positive 
association between the CEO’s equity ownership and firm performance, suggesting that CEOs 
with high equity ownership are closer to optimal incentive levels than CEOs with low equity 
holding. Other authors claim that, on average, equity incentive levels are set optimally, so  a 
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positive relationship between the CEO’s equity incentives and firm performance is not 
obvious (Core et al., 2003). Virtually everything we know about executives’ incentives is 
based on the analysis of the CEO’s compensation structure. A few studies (e.g., Indjejikian 
and Matejka, 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011) investigate the compensation structure 
of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or that of business-unit managers (Bushman et al., 
1995), but most contributions do not consider the effect of compensation of executives other 
than that of the CEO. The focus on the CEO is justified by the belief that the board of 
directors, and in particular the compensation committee, is likely to expend considerable 
effort in optimally setting the CEO’s incentives, and the incentives for other top executives 
are set accordingly. Therefore, the CEO’s compensation is supposed to explain all first-order 
effects, and the incremental effect of non-CEO executives’ compensation is deemed 
insignificant.  
It is surprising that the CMO’s compensation structure and incentive level has never been 
investigated, particularly considering the number of contributions in the marketing literature 
that establish a positive and robust link between marketing processes and firm value. Two 
relatively recent research streams in marketing literature empirically investigate the 
contribution of marketing to the creation of value for shareholders1: one that analyzes 
marketing activities like advertising (Grullon et al., 2004; Joshi and Hanssens, 2004; 
McAlister et al., 2007; Srinivasan et al., 2009),  promotions (Pauwels et al., 2004), 
distribution choices (Geyskens et al., 2002), and new product introduction (Chaney et al., 
1991; Kelm et al.,1995; Pauwels et al., 2004; Sorescu et al., 2007; Srinivasan et al., 2009), 
and the other that focuses on marketing assets, such as: brand equity (Madden et al., 2006), 
customer equity (Gupta et al., 2004), customer satisfaction (Anderson et al., 2004; Fornell et 
                                                 
1 Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009) offer an excellent literature review of these contributions. See also Guo (2002)’s 
contribution. 
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al., 2006), and product quality (Aaker and Jacobson,1994; Srinivasan et al., 2009; Tellis and 
Johnson, 2007). These contributions, which empirically document that marketing strategies 
play a core role in creating shareholder value, can be contextualized in the theoretical 
framework proposed by Srivastava et al. (1998, 1999), who argue that marketing creates 
shareholder value by i) accelerating cash flows; ii) enhancing cash flows by increasing 
revenues and reducing costs, working capital, and fixed investments; iii) reducing the risk 
associated with cash flows; and iv) increasing the firm’s long-term value (terminal value). 
Thus, Srivastava et al. (1998, 1999) posit a powerful relationship between market-based assets 
(like customer and partner relationships), market performance, and shareholder value.  
All of these contributions show that marketing plays a central role in creating shareholder 
value, so it is of interest to both academics and practitioners to clarify how companies incent 
their CMOs and the effect of the CMO’s equity incentives on shareholder value.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses Development  
As Core et al. (2003) point out, the equity-based incentives of employees and executives 
below the CEO level have increasing less important roles as the managers’ actions have 
increasing less effect on stock prices. This view is consistent with the well-known 
informativeness principle proposed by Holmstrom (1979), which proposes that any 
observable signal that reveals on the margin information about the level of a manager’s efforts 
should be included in the contract. Specifically, it is useful to remunerate non-CEO executives 
using equity grants only if these managers can influence the stock price through their actions 
and decisions. If the manager has  a role that doesn’t allow him or her to have any significant 
impact on the stock price because there is a weak causal relation between his or her 
actions/decisions and the firm’s value, the executive will not be motivated by holding equity 
in the firm. On the contrary, these firms could experience higher costs because they have to 
compensate managers for the risk they take when part of their fixed salary is substituted with 
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components like stock and option grants. CMOs should have more potential to influence the 
stock price in firms that invest more in marketing than in firms that invest less, so I expect 
that firms characterized by higher marketing intensity use equity compensation for their 
CMOs to a larger extent than firm that are not. In fact these firms are more likely to perceive 
stock price as an informative signal of CMO’s efforts. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
 
H1: As firms’ marketing intensity increases, the CMO is given more equity incentives. 
 
The second part of the analysis explores whether CMOs’ equity incentives have a positive 
impact on firm value that is incremental to that of the CEO. Equity incentives align executives 
and shareholders’ interests and lead executives to have a long term orientation since their 
wealth is tightly linked to the future value of the company. The marketing literature has 
established a positive link between marketing processes and firm value. To create market-
based assets, the CMO must have a long-term orientation because these assets require large 
marketing investments in the current period that are rewarded only in the future (Srivastava et 
al., 1998, 1999). Therefore, only marketing managers who are focused on the company’s 
future value will be willing to sacrifice current profits to investments in market-based 
intangible assets, while a CMO with a relatively short time horizon will prefer to invest in 
promotion activities with short-term payoffs. Such promotions have been shown to boost 
revenues only temporarily, without improving long-term financial performance and firm value 
(Pauwels et al., 2004). Anderson (1982) argues that marketing may also play a core role in the 
process of strategy formulation, in setting clear objectives, and in supporting a long-run 
orientation in the decision making process. When CMOs are incented based on the long-term 
value of the firm, they are likely to be willing to contribute to strategic development with 
potentially high benefits for shareholders. Therefore, I hypothesize:  
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H2: The level of the CMO’s equity incentives is positively related to shareholder value, after 
controlling for the CEO’s equity incentives. 
 
1.4 Variable Measurement 
Executives’ Equity Incentives 
As Core et al. (2003) emphasize, executives’ incentives from stocks and options are properly 
measured only considering portfolio incentives, so newly granted restricted stocks and stock 
options are not sufficient for evaluating the incentives with which the executive is provided 
(Yermack, 1995). I measure CMOs’ equity incentives (CMO_INCENTIVE) by means of the 
incentive ratio, as computed in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006, p. 519-520). This metric 
measures the power of a CMO’s equity-based incentives as the dollar change in the value of 
the executive’s stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point 
increase in the company’s stock price (CMO_ONEPCT). This measure of incentive is then 
standardized by the amount of cash compensation (base salary and annual bonuses) the 
executive receives during the year. Using Execucomp data for the period 2000-2009, I 
compute the incentive ratio as follows: 
 
CMO_INCENTIVEi,t= CMO_ONEPCTi,t / (CMO_ONEPCTi,t+ CMO_SALARYi,t +CMO_BONUSi,t), 
where      
CMO_ONEPCTi,t = 0.01 * PRICEi,t * (CMO_SHARESi,t + CMO_DELTAi,t * CMO_OPTIONSi,t) 
 
In this specification, PRICE is the fiscal year-end company share price, CMO_SHARES is 
the number of shares held by the CMO as of the fiscal year-end, CMO_OPTIONS is the 
number of options held by the CMO as of the fiscal year-end, and CMO_DELTA is an 
estimate of the delta of the CMO’s option portfolio.  
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In order to get CMO_DELTA, I follow Core and Guay’s (2002) methodology for estimating 
the delta of executives’ option portfolios. CMO’s options are divided into three groups, and 
separate estimates of the delta are computed. The first group is made by options awarded 
during the year; for these options Execucomp reports all necessary information for computing 
the sensitivity of stock options to a one percent change in stock price2. The second group is 
made by options awarded in previous years that are not yet exercisable, and the third group is 
made by options granted in previous years that are currently exercisable. For the second and 
third group of options, Core and Guay (2002) develop and empirically test a methodology for 
approximating the sensitivity of these options to stock price changes, since the necessary 
information for the calculation is not readily available. Core and Guay (2002) show that their 
proxy captures more than 99 percent of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivity. 
Similar to Nath and Mahajan (2008), I deem an executive to be the CMO of the company if 
his or her title includes the term “marketing”3 (Execucomp item “titleann”). Titles of these 
executives include, but are not limited to, CMO and Vice President Marketing. 
We also compute CEO’s equity incentives (CEO_INCENTIVE) using the same methodology 
above described but considering CEO’s stock and option grants. Finally, we create a variable 
that computes the difference in equity incentives between the CMO and the other non-CEO 
executives (DIFF_OTH). The incentive ratio for the other non-CEO executives 
(OTH_INCENTIVE) is the median incentive ratio of all non-CEO and non-CMO executives 
for whom the company discloses compensation data in the proxy statement. The difference in 
equity incentives between non-CEO executives and the CMO is defined as: 
 
DIFF_OTHi,t =  OTH_INCENTIVEi,t – CMO_INCENTIVEi,t 
                                                 
2 Appendix 1. A reports the formula used for computing the sensitivity of individual options to stock price changes. 
3 If a company, in a given year, has more than one top executive with the term “marketing” in the title I keep in the analysis 
the executive with the higher total compensation. 
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Shareholder Value 
I measure shareholder value by means of Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio between the market 
value of a firm’s assets and their replacement cost. The Tobin’s q is a metric of shareholder 
value commonly used in the accounting and finance literature (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Lang 
and Stulz, 1993; Servaes, 1991), as well as in marketing and management literature (e.g., Rao 
et al., 2004; Simon and Sullivan, 1993; Youndt et al., 2004). Higher values of Tobin’s q 
reflect differences in expected discount rates and/or differences in expected future cash flows 
or growth expectations. Following Daske et al. (2008) and Doidge et al. (2004), I compute the 
Tobins’q as (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total 
assets. 
 
Marketing Intensity 
To measure marketing intensity, I first compute marketing investment as the annual amount 
of advertising and R&D expenditures and, following a common practice in marketing 
literature (McAlister et al., 2007), standardize this amount by the firm’s annual sales. As 
McAlister et al. (2007) point out, scaling a firm’s advertising and R&D expenditures by its 
sales rules out the alternative explanation that the effects documented are due to firm size. 
Thus, I compute my measure of interest as4: 
 
MKTG_INTENSITYi,t = (ADVi,t + R&Di,t) / SALESi,t 
 
where ADV is the annual advertising expenditure, R&D is annual R&D expenditure, and 
SALES is firm’s sales, as disclosed in the Compustat dataset. Advertising expenditures 
                                                 
4 Since all my conclusions are based on this metric I do not set missing advertising and R&D data to zero. In fact, for these 
observations, I cannot distinguish between zero values and not available information. This conservative research design 
choice is necessary for assuring the integrity of results. 
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include the cost of advertising media (i.e., radio, television, and periodicals) and promotional 
expenses, while R&D expenditures include all costs incurred during the year that relate to the 
development of new products or services. The focus on advertising and R&D expenditures is 
consistent with the fact that they represent two of the four marketing mix levers (i.e., 
promotion and product) available to the CMO for shaping the marketing strategy. This choice 
is also corroborated by previous marketing literature that has focused on advertising and R&D 
activities when analyzing the impact of marketing on the firm’s value (e.g., Chaney et al., 
1991; Grullon et al., 2004; Grullon et al., 2006; Joshi and Hanssens, 2004; Kelm et al.,1995; 
Mathur et al., 1997;  Mathur and Mathur, 2000; McAlister et al., 2007; Pauwels et al., 2004; 
Sorescu et al., 2007; Srinivasan et al., 2009). Marketing activities like distribution and 
placement, even if they are part of the marketing mix, are not included in the measure of 
marketing intensity because of data availability, but the documented focus of the marketing 
literature on the variables included in the metric suggest that the first-order effects of the 
phenomenon under investigation should be captured by these variables. 
 
Control Variables 
The empirical analysis includes several control variables that have been commonly used in the 
literature as determinants of executive compensation. 
CASH_CONS is the firm’s cash constraints (Carter et al., 2007; Core and Guay, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 1996; Yermack, 1995), computed as the three-year average of [(Common and 
preferred dividends – cash flow from investing – cash flow from operations)/total assets]; 
VOLAT is the stock returns’ volatility as a proxy for monitoring difficulty (Core and Guay, 
1999),  calculated as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns computed for the twelve 
preceding months; CAPEX is a proxy for investment opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992), 
computed as the ratio between capital expenditures and annual sales; ROA is the firm’s 
performance, calculated as operating income after depreciation divided by total assets 
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(Murphy, 1985); SIZE is the natural log transformation of the firm’s total assets (Himmelberg 
and Hubbard, 2000; Jin, 2002); and DIV_YLD is the firm’s dividend yield, computed as the 
average dividend yield over the three-year period ending the year prior to the year of interest 
(Carter et al., 2007). 
When using Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, I also control for the annual growth in sales 
(GROWTH) and for the level of leverage (LEV), computed as long-term debt over the book 
value of equity. Leverage and growth are usually included in the analysis of determinants of 
shareholder value. 
Finally, I control for industry effects by defining the three macro industries to which my 
observations belong: the manufacturing industry (MANUFACTURING), the trade industry 
(TRADE), and the service and finance (SER_FIN) industry. MANUFACTURING is a 
dummy variable set to one if the firm’s two-digit SIC code is between 20 and 39, and zero 
otherwise; TRADE is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s two-digit SIC code is between 
50 and 59, and zero otherwise; and SER_FIN is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s two-
digit SIC code is between 60 and 89, and zero otherwise.  
 
1.5 Sample Selection 
Table 1.1 summarizes the sample selection process that led to the final sample of 227 firms 
and 586 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2009. Beginning with the 17,799 firm-
year observations in Execucomp database for the period 2000-2009 for which it is possible to 
identify a CEO, 1,245 firm-year observations with no full data on CEO compensation, an 
additional 14,561 firm-year observations with missing data on CMO compensation, an 
additional 1,323 firm-year observations with missing advertising and/or R&D expenditures, 
and an addition 84 firm-year observations with missing data for computing the control 
variables are deleted, resulting in a final sample of 586 firm-year observations representing 32 
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different two-digit SIC code industries. Table 1.2, instead, describes the final sample in terms 
of industry groups and years.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample. In order to reduce the undue 
influence of outliers, variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
# Obs.
Firm-year observations in Execucomp for the period 2000-2009 with an identifiable CEO 17,799
minus
Firm-year observations with no data for computing CEO's incentive ratio 1,245
Firm-year observations with no data for computing CMO's incentive ratio 14,561
Firm-year observations with missing data on advertising and/or R&D expenditures 1,323
Firm-year observations with missing data on control variables 84
Final Sample 586
Unique Firms 227
TABLE 1.1
Sample Selection
Year # obs. % Industry Group # obs. %
2000 30 5.09 Manufacturing 287 49.0
2001 45 7.64 Trade 163 27.8
2002 52 8.83 Service and Finance 136 23.2
2003 62 10.53 Total 586 100.0
2004 67 11.38
2005 69 11.71
2006 59 10.53
2007 72 12.22
2008 67 11.38
2009 63 10.7
Total 586 100.0
TABLE 1.2
Sample Composition
13 
 
 
 
The descriptive analysis shows that the CMO is, on average, provided with fewer equity 
incentives than the CEO (median equity incentives of 0.077 and 0.206, respectively5). This 
result is not unexpected since stock price is a particularly informative signal of the CEO’s 
efforts and firms commonly use equity grants for compensating CEOs. The marketing 
intensity metric’s median value of 0.083 indicates that, on average, firms invest in advertising 
and R&D at the rate of 8.3 percent of annual sales. Statistics on SIZE, ROA, and 
CASH_CONS show that the sample is made up of large and profitable firms with relatively 
low cash constraints, while Tobin’s q values document that the sample firms’ market value of 
assets average more than twice their replacement value, as proxied for by the book value of 
assets. All variables appear to be in reasonable ranges and to be comparable to those in similar 
studies. 
                                                 
5 Wilcoxon signed rank sum test indicates that the difference is significant at 1% level. 
N Mean SD p25 Median p75
Equity Incentives
CEO_INCENTIVE 586 0.280 0.238 0.116 0.206 0.372
CMO_INCENTIVE 586 0.100 0.090 0.036 0.077 0.138
DIFF_OTH 586 0.009 0.080 -0.015 0.006 0.036
N Mean SD p25 Median p75
Marketing Investment Intensity
MKTG_INTENSITY 586 0.116 0.116 0.031 0.083 0.171
N Mean SD p25 Median p75
Control Variables
CASH_CONS 586 -0.015 0.093 -0.067 -0.019 0.026
VOLAT 586 0.141 0.079 0.084 0.121 0.167
CAPEX 586 0.056 0.058 0.023 0.038 0.069
ROA 586 0.075 0.112 0.031 0.085 0.137
SIZE 586 6.826 1.473 5.827 6.704 7.584
DIV_YLD 586 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.006
TOBIN_Q 586 2.192 1.208 1.319 1.840 2.690
LEV 586 0.319 0.881 0.000 0.050 0.498
GROWTH 586 0.098 0.229 -0.018 0.075 0.185
Variable definition in Appendix 1.B
TABLE 1. 3
Descriptive Statistics
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Univariate Analysis 
Table 1.4 shows the Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the variables in the analysis. 
Consistent with H1, marketing intensity (MKTG_INTENSITY) is positively correlated with 
the CMO’s equity incentives (CMO_INCENTIVE). The univariate analysis also shows that 
the CMO’s equity incentives are positively related to shareholder value (TOBIN_Q), thus 
providing preliminary support for H2. However, these results are inconclusive with respect to 
the paper’s research questions because they fail to rule out the possibility that the CEO’s 
equity incentives are the only determinant of the CMO’s incentives and of shareholder value. 
This alternative explanation is supported by the high correlation between the CEO’s and the 
CMO’s incentives and between the CEO’s incentives and shareholder value. The multivariate 
analysis will address this issue by documenting the incremental effects.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
To investigate H1, I propose the following OLS model with year fixed effects and robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level: 
 
CMO_INCENTIVEi,t = α0 + α1 * MKTG_INTENSITYi,t + α2 * CEO_INCENTIVEi,t+ α3 * 
CASH_CONSi,t + α4 * VOLATi,t + α5 * CAPEXi,t + α6 * ROAi,t + α7 * 
SIZEi,t + α8 * DIV_YLDi,t + α9 * TRADEi,t + α10 * 
MANUFACTURINGi,t +  εi,t                                                                                                 (1) 
 
An important concern that arises when estimating model (1) by OLS relates to the presence of 
sample selection bias. As Table 1.1 shows, many firm year observations are lost because of 
missing data on the CMO’s compensation. In fact, the CMO must be one of the highest paid 
executives for his or her compensation to be available. It could be that the CMO in a given 
firm never enters this group of executives because his or her remuneration is not high enough 
or because the CMO is among the highest paid executives one year and not the next.   
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 CEO_INCENTIVE 1
2 CMO_INCENTIVE 0.479*** 1
3 DIFF_OTH -0.023 -0.425*** 1
4 MKTG_INTENSITY 0.049 0.121** -0.071 1
5 CASH_CONS -0.052 -0.055 -0.011 0.120** 1
6 VOLAT -0.081* -0.139*** -0.041 0.194*** 0.300*** 1
7 CAPEX 0.174*** 0.161*** -0.021 0.240*** 0.175*** 0.128** 1
8 ROA 0.224*** 0.195*** 0.056 -0.424*** -0.446*** -0.391*** -0.069 1
9 SIZE 0.194*** 0.257*** 0.105* -0.187*** -0.077 -0.243*** 0.071 0.230*** 1
10 DIV_YLD -0.052 -0.137*** 0.011 -0.224*** -0.070 -0.096* -0.063 0.068 0.177*** 1
11 TOBIN_Q 0.429*** 0.430*** -0.078 0.082* -0.079 -0.046 0.116** 0.348*** -0.144*** -0.100* 1
12 LEV -0.079 -0.040 0.063 -0.057 0.033 -0.105* 0.031 0.000 0.166*** 0.131** -0.116** 1
13 GROWTH 0.180*** 0.188*** -0.021 -0.025 0.103* -0.088* 0.228*** 0.255*** 0.054 -0.108** 0.256*** -0.002
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Variable definition in Appendix 1.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
TABLE 1.4
Correlation Matrix
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This possibility increases the probability that the final sample has a selection bias. If the final 
sample is not representative of the whole population, results cannot be generalized and the 
analysis would lack external validity. 
In order to correct for the potential presence of sample selection bias, I estimate all models 
using Heckman’s (1979) two-step method. The Heckman analysis can adjust for sample 
selection bias based only on observable characteristics and cannot control for bias coming 
from unobservable characteristics that are not included in the selection equation. Since no 
model for detecting the selection equation is present in the literature, I propose the following 
parsimonious equation for modeling the probability of an observation’s being included in the 
final sample: 
 
SELECTIONi,t = δ0 + δ1 * NUM_EXEi,t + δ2 * MKTG_INTENSITYi,t + δ3 * ROAi,t + δ4 * 
SIZEi,t + δ5* TRADEi,t + δ6 * MANUFACTURINGi,t + ∑ YEAR௜,௧ଽ௧ୀଵ  + ηi,t,              
(S) 
 
where i,t denotes the firm and year observation, SELECTION is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the observation is included in the final sample and zero otherwise, and 
NUM_EXE is the number of executives for whom the company discloses compensation data. 
The other variables have already been defined. Data are retrieved from Execucomp and 
Compustat database. All available observations on Execucomp database over the period 2000-
2009 with data for estimating (S) are used to implement the Heckman model. The overall 
sample for implementing Heckman’s procedure is made up of 4,085 firm-year observations. 
Table 1.5 presents results of a firm-cluster adjusted probit model for (S). The model appears 
to be well-specified, with most variables statistically significant. The test of overall model 
significance strongly rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.0002). 
 17 
 
 
 
Table 1.5 shows that, as expected, higher marketing intensity increases the probability that the 
observation is included in the analysis. Table 1.5 also shows that the CMO’s compensation is 
more likely to be available when companies disclose compensation data for a larger number 
of executives than when they disclose data for a smaller number of executives. While firm 
performance does not influence the selection probability, firm size has a negative relationship 
to the selection variable. Finally, the coefficient on TRADE is positive and significant, 
suggesting that firms in the trade industry are more likely to disclose data on CMO 
compensation than is the finance and service industry (the control group). Table 1.6 presents 
results from model (1), estimated by using Heckman two-stage method.  
Dependent variable
SELECTION
Independent variables
NUM_EXE 0.064**
[0.027]
MKTG_INTENSITY 1.042***
[0.399]
ROA 0.051
[0.353]
SIZE -0.098***
[0.027]
TRADE 0.234*
[0.133]
MANUFACTURING 0.087
[0.110]
Constant -0.960***
[0.265]
YEAR DUMMIES YES
N = 4,085
Pseudo R2 = 0.0240
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002
TABLE 1.5
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Selection Equation
The table reports results from the first-stage 
Heckman selection model. Variable definition in 
Appendix 1.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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The positive and significant coefficient on marketing intensity (MKTG_INTENSITY) 
indicates that, when companies invest more in marketing (i.e., advertising and R&D), the 
CMO is provided with more equity incentives, giving support to H1. That the Inverse Mills 
[1] [2]
Dependent variable
CMO_INCENTIVE
Independent variables
MKTG_INTENSITY 0.240*** 0.233***
[0.073] [0.067]
CEO_INCENTIVE 0.058**
[0.024]
CASH_CONS 0.008 0.026
[0.026] [0.031]
VOLAT -0.049* -0.056*
[0.027] [0.033]
CAPEX 0.047 0.028
[0.040] [0.059]
ROA 0.078 0.084
[0.066] [0.059]
SIZE -0.008 -0.006
[0.005] [0.005]
DIV_YLD -0.594*** -0.767***
[0.194] [0.215]
INVERSE MILLS RATIO 0.172*** 0.156***
[0.014] [0.014]
TRADE 0.025 0.240*
[0.025] [0.130]
MANUFACTURING 0.006 0.091
[0.020] [0.104]
Constant -0.191*** -1.006***
[0.048] [0.231]
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES
N 586 586
R2 0.219 0.335
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
TABLE 1.6
Economic Determinants of CMOs’ Equity Incentives
The table presents results from a firm cluster-adjusted regression model 
with sample selection. Variable definition in Appendix 1.B. *,**,*** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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ratio is highly significant suggests that the Heckman’s correction for sample selection bias is 
necessary and that OLS coefficients would otherwise be biased.  
The coefficient on the CEO’s equity incentives is positive and significant, indicating that the 
CMO’s and the CEO’s equity incentives move in the same direction. Nonetheless, because 
the coefficient on marketing intensity is still significant after controlling for the CEO’s equity 
incentives, the CEO’s incentives are not the only determinant of the incentives the CMO gets. 
Coefficients from column 2 in Table 1.6 indicate that, ceteris paribus, moving from the first 
to the second quartile of the marketing intensity variable, mean (median) CMO equity 
incentives increase by 12 percent (16%), showing that the results documented are both 
statistically and economically significant.  
The next part of the analysis determines whether marketing intensity is a driver of equity 
incentives that is unique to the CMO or whether it also drives the equity incentives of the 
other non-CEO executives. For this purpose we use the variable, previously defined, 
DIFF_OTH that computes the difference in equity incentives between the CMO and the other 
non-CEO executives. Negative values of DIFF_OTH indicate that the CMO’s equity 
incentives are higher than those of other non-CEO executives. Therefore, if marketing 
intensity only drives the CMO’s incentives or drives CMO’s incentives to a larger extent than 
other executives’ incentives, a negative coefficient on MKTG_INTENSITY should result 
when using DIFF_OTH as the dependent variable.  
The results shown in Table 1.7 from model (1) estimated using DIFF_OTH as the dependent 
variable corroborate the support for H1, suggesting that the company’s marketing intensity 
explains not only the CMO’s equity incentives but also the difference between the CMO’s 
incentives and those of the other non-CEO executives. Specifically, Table 1.7 indicates that 
when marketing intensity increases, companies increase the level of CMO’s equity incentives 
but don’t adjust the incentives of the other non-CEO executives proportionately.   
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My research design assumes that a firm’s marketing intensity is exogenous with respect to the 
CMO’s equity incentives—that is, that a CMO can decide how to invest the marketing budget 
(e.g., long-term-oriented marketing campaigns vs. short-term promotion activities) based on 
[1] [2]
Dependent variable
DIFF_OTH
Independent variables
MKTG_INTENSITY -0.150** -0.150***
[0.060] [0.058]
CEO_INCENTIVE 0.002
[0.024]
CASH_CONS -0.007 -0.007
[0.034] [0.035]
VOLAT -0.039 -0.040
[0.038] [0.038]
CAPEX -0.039 -0.040
[0.058] [0.063]
ROA 0.024 0.023
[0.047] [0.049]
SIZE 0.016*** 0.016***
[0.005] [0.005]
DIV_YLD -0.333 -0.332
[0.279] [0.274]
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.098*** -0.098***
[0.030] [0.029]
TRADE -0.045** -0.045*
[0.022] [0.023]
MANUFACTURING -0.013 -0.012
[0.015] [0.014]
Constant 0.109** 0.109**
[0.055] [0.054]
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES
N 586 586
R2 0.045 0.051
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
TABLE 1.7
Economic Determinants of the Difference in Equity Incentives between the 
CMO and the other non-CEO Executives
The table presents results from a firm cluster-adjusted regression model with 
sample selection. Variable definition in Appendix 1.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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his or her incentive scheme, but cannot decide to spend more on marketing, thereby changing 
company’s marketing intensity ratio. Therefore, in my research design the firm’s marketing 
intensity is determined by the firm’s corporate strategy and other industry-related 
characteristics while the choice of how to allocate marketing resources varies according to the 
CMO’s equity incentives. Given the importance of this assumption for the results, the 
robustness check session uses an instrumental variable approach to check for possible 
endogeneity problems. 
In investigating H2, which deals with the impact of the CMO’s equity incentives on 
shareholder value, I fit the following firm cluster-adjusted regression models with sample 
selection and year fixed effects6: 
 
TOBIN_Qi,t = γ0 + γ1 * CMO_INCENTIVEi,t + γ2 * CEO_INCENTIVEi,t + γ3 * 
MKTG_INTENSITYi,t+ γ4 * VOLATi,t + γ5 * CAPEXi,t +γ6 * ROAi,t + γ7 * SIZEi,t 
+γ8 * GROWTHi,t+ γ9 * LEVi,t + γ10 * TRADEi,t + γ11 * MANUFACTURINGi,t + 
θi,t                                                                                                                           (2) 
 
where i,t denotes the firm and year observations and all variables are computed as previously 
described. Table 1.8 shows results from estimating model (2). The coefficient on 
CMO_INCENTIVE documents a positive and significant relationship between the CMO’s 
equity incentives and shareholder value, suggesting that, when a firm provides the CMO with 
higher levels of equity incentives, the firm’s value significantly increases. Column 2 of Table 
1.8 indicates that the positive effect of the CMO’s incentives on shareholder value is 
incremental to that of the CEO, thus providing support for H2. In particular, estimate results 
indicate that, ceteris paribus, moving from the first to the second quartile of CMOs’ equity 
incentives increases the mean (median) Tobin’s q by 7 percent (8%). As a consequence, the 
CMO’s equity incentives are far from being a second-order effect. 
                                                 
6 The selection equation used as first stage is the one defined in (S). 
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Finally, the last part of the paper examines whether the positive impact on the firm value of 
the CMO’s equity incentives exists only in those firms that invest in marketing more than the 
industry average or whether  the documented results hold for all firms. In order to shed light 
on this issue, the sample is divided between companies that invest in marketing more than the 
[1] [2]
Dependent variable
TOBIN_Q
Independent variables
CMO_INCENTIVE 5.045*** 3.796***
[1.107] [0.939]
CEO_INCENTIVE 1.222***
[0.312]
MKTG_INTENSITY 0.677 0.709
[0.674] [0.662]
VOLAT 1.595* 1.456*
[0.834] [0.759]
CAPEX 0.879 0.440
[0.974] [0.979]
ROA 4.256*** 3.832***
[0.877] [0.898]
SIZE -0.220*** -0.239***
[0.041] [0.042]
GROWTH 0.372 0.326
[0.232] [0.213]
LEV -0.041 -0.016
[0.050] [0.048]
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.192*** -0.199***
[0.074] [0.068]
TRADE -0.475*** -0.340*
[0.178] [0.180]
MANUFACTURING -0.330** -0.253*
[0.152] [0.150]
Constant 2.758*** 2.710***
[0.403] [0.385]
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES
N 586 586
R2 0.413 0.452
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
TABLE 1.8
CMO’s Equity Incentives and Shareholder Value
The table presents results from a firm cluster-adjusted regression model 
with sample selection. Variable definition in Appendix 1.B. *,**,*** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
 23 
 
industry average and those that invest less, with a dummy variable (HIGH)7 taking the value 
of one (zero) if the firm’s marketing intensity is above (below) the median marketing intensity 
of the industry, computed separately each year. After interacting CMO_INCENTIVE  with 
this dummy, I fit the following model with sample selection8, firm-clustered standard errors, 
and year fixed effects: 
 
TOBIN_Qi,t = π 0 + π1 * CMO_INCENTIVEi,t +  π2 * CMO_INCENTIVE * HIGHi,t + π3 * 
CEO_INCENTIVEi,t + π 4 * HIGH + π5 * VOLATi,t + π6 * CAPEXi,t + π7 * ROAi,t 
+ π8 * SIZEi,t + π9 * GROWTHi,t+ π10 * LEVi,t + π11 * TRADEi,t + π12 * 
MANUFACTURINGi,t + θi,t                                                                             (3) 
 
Table 1.9 shows results from model (3). Coefficients reported indicate that the CMO’s equity 
incentives are positively associated with shareholder value both in low marketing intensity 
firms (π1>0) and in high marketing intensity firms (π1+π2>0). The interaction term (π2) is not 
statistically different from zero, so the positive effect of the CMO’s incentives on firm value 
doesn’t differ based on whether the company invests in marketing more or less than average 
in  the same industry. This result, which suggests a strategic role of the CMO that goes well 
beyond simply managing marketing investments, is consistent with Anderson’s (1982) 
seminal work, which indicates a core role of marketing in the process of strategy formulation, 
in setting clear objectives, and in supporting a long-run orientation in the decision making 
process. Srivastava et al. (1998) also point to a strategic role of marketing (and, consequently, 
of the CMO) that is not merely linked to the level of advertising and R&D expenditure. 
Finally, whether the marketing expenditure is above or below the industry median, the CMO 
may decide to engage in marketing activities that affect firm value either in the long term or in 
the short term. All of these observations are consistent with the CMO’s equity incentives 
                                                 
7 Results are qualitatively similar if I use a continuous variable instead of the dummy variable. 
8 In order to maintain consistency between the first and the second stage of the model I substitute in the selection equation the 
variable MKTG_INTENSITY with the dummy ABOVE. 
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having a positive relationship with shareholder value in both high-marketing intensity and 
low- marketing intensity firms. 
 
[1] [2]
Dependent variable
TOBIN_Q
Independent variables
CMO_INCENTIVE 5.367*** 4.067***
[0.847] [0.843]
CMO_INCENTIVE*HIGH -0.251 -0.137
[1.563] [1.415]
CEO_INCENTIVE 1.210***
[0.308]
HIGH 0.195 0.173
[0.160] [0.148]
VOLAT 1.552* 1.402*
[0.846] [0.775]
CAPEX 1.090 0.683
[0.872] [0.891]
ROA 4.068*** 3.626***
[0.865] [0.880]
SIZE -0.209*** -0.228***
[0.041] [0.043]
GROWTH 0.380 0.334
[0.239] [0.218]
LEV -0.041 -0.017
[0.049] [0.047]
INVERSE MILLS RATIO -0.220** -0.232***
[0.098] [0.090]
TRADE -0.686*** -0.562***
[0.171] [0.172]
MANUFACTURING -0.422*** -0.350**
[0.153] [0.152]
Constant 2.921*** 2.918***
[0.439] [0.418]
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES
p-value: p-value:
0.0003 0.0007
N 586 586
R2 0.412 0.450
Ha: (CMO_INCENTIVE + 
CMO_INCENTIVE*HIGH) > 0
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
Coef.
[Std. Err.]
TABLE 1.9
The table presents results from a firm cluster-adjusted regression model with 
sample selection. Variable definition in Appendix 1.B. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
CMO’s Equity Incentives and Shareholder Value: A Comparison 
between High vs Low Marketing Intensity Firms. 
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Therefore, while results from the first part of the paper show that companies tend to incent the 
CMO only when they invest more in marketing, results in this last set of analyses suggest that 
the positive effect on the value of the CMO’s incentives is not limited to those firms with high 
marketing intensity. A possible alternative explanation is related to the fact that CMOs in high 
marketing intensity firms are nearer to the optimal level of incentives since they are provided 
with higher levels of equity incentives. Therefore, the potentially higher benefit of providing 
better incentives to the CMO in firms with high marketing intensity could be offset if CMOs 
in these companies already receive higher levels of equity incentives and are close to the 
optimal level of incentives. 
 
1.7 Robustness Checks 
This section describes several robustness checks performed to ensure that the results 
documented are not driven by choices made in the research design. 
 
Marketing Intensity 
In order to ensure that the measure of marketing intensity used in this paper is not driven 
primarily by differences in firm size, I scaled advertising and R&D expenditures by annual 
sales. Another approach is to scale marketing investments by total assets (McAlister et al., 
2007). As Cheng and Chen (1997) point out, the choice of the scalar variable is not a trivial 
issue since it may change the results as well as their interpretation. Untabulated results show 
that using total assets as scalar leads to qualitatively similar results. 
I also tried to disentangle the marketing intensity metric into its two components (i.e., 
advertising and R&D expenditures) in order to determine whether results are just driven by 
both or only one of them. Untabulated results obtained by estimating model (1) using the two 
metrics separately indicate that both are positively related to the CMO’s equity incentives and 
 26 
 
negatively related to the difference in incentives between other non-CEO executives and the 
CMO. 
 
Fiscal Year-end Stock Price as Omitted Correlated Variable 
It could be argued that there is a mechanical relationship between the CMO’s equity 
incentives in year t and the Tobin’s q computed at the end of the same fiscal year. In fact, 
analyzing how the CMO’s incentives and Tobin’s q are computed shows that both metrics 
include in their computations the company’s fiscal year-end stock price. In order to address 
this issue, I augment equation (2) and (3) by including as an additional regressor the 
company’s fiscal year-end stock price. If the potential mechanical relationship exists, this 
augmented model would control for it. Untabulated results show that, as expected, fiscal year-
end stock price positively and significantly loads on Tobin’s q, but all of the coefficients of 
interest maintain their sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. 
 
Endogeneity 
This section uses an instrumental variable approach to test for potential endogeneity between 
the CMO’s incentives and the firm’s marketing intensity. As an instrument for the firm’s 
marketing intensity, I use the marketing intensity of the industry to which the company 
belongs, excluding the company itself9. The firm’s marketing intensity is likely to be highly 
correlated with the industry’s marketing intensity, while the marketing intensity of the whole 
industry is not influenced by the incentives of the firm’s CMO. Supporting the choice of the 
industry’s marketing intensity as a valid instrument, in the final sample the firm’s and the 
industry’s marketing intensity are correlated at 60 percent. Untabulated results from an IV 
approach confirm those presented. 
 
                                                 
9 Industry is defined using the two digit SIC code. 
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Shareholder Value 
Finally, I estimate models (2) and (3) using two different specifications of shareholder value. 
In a first robustness check I used as a proxy for shareholder value the change in Tobin’s q 
with respect to the previous year and,  in a second analysis, the Tobin’s q computed at time 
(t+1) instead of at time (t). Untabulated results yield to results that are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in the main analysis, and all conclusions are unchanged. 
 
1.8 Implications for Future Research and Practice  
Using a sample of 586 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2009, this research sheds 
light on the economic determinants and effects on shareholder value of the CMO’s equity 
incentives. Specifically, I find that firms with more marketing intensity give their CMOs more 
equity incentives and that CMOs’ incentives are positively related to shareholder value. These 
findings have important implications for both theory and practice. 
First, results documented in the paper challenge the mainstream view that the CEO’s 
compensation captures all first-order effects and that the consequences of the compensation 
structure of executives other than the CEO are negligible. By focusing on a non-CEO 
executive who manages processes and activities that extant literature has documented are 
particularly important in creating shareholder value, the paper documents that non-CEO 
executives play an important role in delivering shareholder value when they are properly 
incented. Moreover, the paper shows that companies do not simply rescale CEOs’ incentives 
when deciding how to incent other top executives but take a proactive role in detecting other 
economic determinants in order to set the appropriate level of incentives. These results are 
likely to open a wide research stream that analyzes the economic determinants of other non-
CEO executives’ incentives and their effects on firm value. This paper also complements the 
literature stream that investigates the relationship between marketing and firm performance by 
providing insights on the economic determinants  and effects on value of CMO’s incentives.  
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Findings reported in the paper warn companies not to focus only on setting the CEO’s 
incentives while neglecting to incent other top executives properly. In particular, results 
suggest that companies should try to incent the CMO independently based on his or her 
marketing budget because the CMO can boost shareholder value on a way that is incremental 
to how the CEO does so. As a consequence, if the board of directors decides not to provide 
the CMO with sufficient equity incentives, it is likely that this decision will be suboptimal for 
shareholders. This aspect of the paper’s findings is particularly important because academic 
research, by focusing on the CEO, could convey to practitioners the wrong message: that all 
firm efforts should be devoted to properly incenting only the CEO.  
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APPENDIX 1.A 
 
Estimates of a stock option’s sensitivity to stock price are calculated based on the Black-
Scholes (1973) formula for valuing European call options, modified to account for dividend 
payout (Merton, 1973). 
 
Option value= [S ݁ିௗ்N(Z) - X݁ି௥்N(Z – σT(1/2)], 
where 
Z = [ln(S/X) + T (r – d + σ2/2]/σT(1/2) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
r = risk-free interest rate 
d = expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price is defined as: 
 
[ߜሺ݋݌ݐ݅݋݊ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ሻ/ߜሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ሻሿ כ ሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁/100ሻ ൌ  ݁ିௗ்ܰሺܼሻ כ ሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁/100ሻ 
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APPENDIX 1.B 
 
Variable Definition 
CEO_INCENTIVE 
Dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come 
from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price, standardized by 
cash compensation 
CMO_INCENTIVE 
Dollar change in the value of CMO's stock and option holdings that would come 
from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price, standardized by 
cash compensation 
DIFF_OTH Difference between the equity incentives of non-CEO and non-CMO executives w.r.t. CMO' equity incentives 
MKTG_INTENSITY Sum of annual advertising and R&D expenditure divided by total sales 
CASH_CONS 
Firm’s cash constraints computed as the three-year average of [(Common and 
preferred dividends – cash flow from investing – cash flow from operations)/total 
assets] 
VOLAT Standard deviation of monthly stock returns computed for the twelve preceding months 
CAPEX Ratio between capital expenditures and annual sales 
ROA Operating income after depreciation divided by total assets  
SIZE Natural log transformation of the firm’s total assets 
DIV_YLD Firm’s dividend yield, computed as the average dividend yield over the three-year period ending the year prior to the year of interest  
TOBIN_Q Firm's Tobin's Q computed as (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) scaled by total assets 
LEV Long-term debt over the book value of equity 
GROWTH Percentage annual growth in sales  
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Chapter 2 
 
CEO Incentives and the Trade-off among 
Earnings Game Strategies 
with Antonio Parbonetti 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper analyzes how CEO’s equity incentives, risk incentives and career concerns drive the 
trade-off among earnings game strategies1.    
Accounting literature documented that investors reward firms that meet or beat earnings 
expectations (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2005). It 
is widely known that to meet earnings targets managers may engage in the “numbers game”, 
making choices among three non mutually exclusive strategies. Specifically, executives can alter 
reported earnings through real or accrual earnings management (e.g. Schipper, 1989; Degeorge 
et al., 1999; Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006) and/or guide analysts’ expectations 
downward in an attempt of avoiding negative earnings surprises (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; 
Matsumoto, 2002). 
 Previous literature showed that stricter regulation (i.e. the passage of the SOX) and firm’s 
specific characteristics influence the relative costliness of each earnings game strategy. 
Moreover, Zang (2012) and Cohen et al. (2008) show that when one earning management 
strategy is relatively more costly for the firm, executives engage in more of the other. However, 
                                                 
1 In this paper we consider numbers game and earnings game as synonymous and refer to them as executives’ 
practice of jamming a signal to the market by manipulating earnings or guiding analysts’ expectations. 
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quite surprisingly, extant research fails to recognize that earnings game strategies are decided 
and executed by the CEO, who is going to consider in the choice of how meeting/beating targets 
also her personal costs and benefits. Therefore, we aim at investigating if and to which extent 
CEO’s incentives shape the trade-off among i) real earnings management, ii) accrual-based 
earnings management and iii) analysts’ expectation guidance. 
Secondly, we turn to the investigation of the economic consequences of using the different 
earnings game strategies. The underlying intuition is that the three strategies analyzed are not 
equivalent in terms of costs imposed on the firm because real earnings management, contrary to 
the other two options, alters firm’s operations and investing activities, making them to deviate 
from their normal course without an underlying economic reason. Thus, this earnings game 
strategy is likely to be the most costly for shareholders since it might impair firm’s future value. 
Using a sample of 4,471 quarterly observations, from 1,088 U.S. firms that are likely to have 
engaged in the earnings game over the period 2003-20010, we show that CEOs trade off the 
different earnings game strategies according to their personal benefits and costs. Specifically, we 
find that CEOs with high equity incentives and high career concerns engage less in real activity 
manipulations than executives with low incentives, and substitute this earnings game strategy 
with other alternatives. Additionally, we document that firms using real activity manipulation to 
meet/beat targets have lower future market performances than firms using accrual earnings 
management or analysts’ guidance. This result validates our conjecture that earnings game 
strategies that mostly rely on the alteration of real activities impose very high costs on 
shareholders. CEOs appear to understand and anticipate these effects and, when their interests 
are aligned with those of shareholders in terms of equity incentives and career concerns, they 
avoid to choose real earnings management strategies. 
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This paper adds to several research streams in accounting literature. First, at the best of our 
knowledge this is the first study that investigates the effect of CEO’s incentives on all earnings 
game strategies simultaneously considered. In fact, previous studies considered the different 
earnings game alternatives one by one and did not analyze the trade-off among them as a function 
of CEO’s personal incentives (e.g. Pourciau, 1993; Wells, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). As long as executives consider earnings game strategies as 
substitute (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), the focus on just one or two alternatives does not 
allow to understand and investigate the trade-off faced by CEOs when deciding how to meet/beat 
earnings targets. On the contrary, by jointly analyzing all earnings game strategies we are able to 
show how personal incentives motivate CEOs to substitute earnings game strategies in an attempt 
to maximize their personal utility. In this vein we add to the results in Matsumoto (2002), Cohen 
et al. (2008), Bartov and Cohen (2009) and Zang (2012), showing that reporting environment and 
firm-related characteristics are not the only determinants of earnings game strategies.  
Second, we contribute to the recent research stream investigating the economic consequences of 
using the different earnings management strategies for meeting/beating benchmarks. Findings on 
this issue are controversial and conclusions are not unanimous (see Chen et al., 2010; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Das et al., 2011). We contribute to this debate by focusing on the 
effects of engaging in the earnings game using real earnings management instead of managing 
accruals or guiding analysts’ expectations, as well as by formally considering the presence of 
endogeneity between reporting strategies and firm’s performance. 
Third, we contribute to academic research investigating the effectiveness of executive incentives 
in solving agency problems (e.g. Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Core et al., 1999). Specifically, 
we show that equity and career incentives have the intended effect of making CEOs less prone to 
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engage in earnings game strategies that impair firm’s future shareholder value, and thus are 
effective in aligning CEOs and shareholders’ interests.  
 
2.2 Background and Motivation 
Accounting literature has argued that executives can play the earnings game using three not 
mutually exclusive strategies:  
 
 Real earnings management. Managers engaging in real earnings manipulations make the 
firm to departure from its normal operational practices in order to mislead at least some 
stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal 
course of operations (Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 337).  
 Accrual-based earnings management. Executives can use the managerial discretion left 
by accounting principles to shift income overtime (Degeorge et al., 1999);  
 Analysts’ expectation guidance. Managers can avoid negative earnings surprises by 
guiding analysts’ forecasts downward (Bartov et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 2002);  
 
Previous literature analyzed how institutional changes and firm specific incentives influence the 
trade-off among earnings management strategies. Cohen et al. (2008) show that the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) triggered a shift from accrual to real earnings management, while 
Bartov and Cohen (2009) point out that in the post-SOX period, with respect to pre-SOX era, 
there is a decline in both accrual earnings management and downward earnings expectation 
management but an increase in real earnings management. These findings are consistent with the 
intuition that the SOX imposed high costs on accrual manipulation and constrained analysts’ 
guidance, thus inducing executives to shift to real earnings management that is more difficult to 
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be detected. Zang (2012) focuses on accrual and real earnings management and investigates 
several firm’s related characteristics that influence the relative costliness of these two earnings 
game strategies. Results in Zang (2012) indicate that real activity manipulation is constrained by 
firms’ competitive status in the industry, financial health, scrutiny from institutional investors and 
tax consequences of manipulation.  
In a similar vein, Matsumoto (2002) analyzes the trade-off between accrual-based earnings 
management and analysts’ expectation guidance and suggests that firm characteristics play a role 
in how companies meet analysts’ expectations. Overall, these contributions suggest that 
executives trade off earnings game strategies considering the relative costs and benefits. 
A related research stream investigated the relationship between CEO’s incentives and firm’s 
decisions to manipulate earnings. For instance, Bauman and Shaw (2006) and Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) document a positive relationship between equity-based compensation and the 
probability that the firm meets analysts’ targets. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that the 
use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced in firms where 
CEO’s total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stocks. In the same vein, Grant et 
al. (2009) find that CEOs risk-taking incentives are positively related to income smoothing.  
Pourciau (1993), instead, focuses on CEO’s turnover and shows that incoming executives 
manage accruals in a way that decreases earnings in the year of the executive change and 
increases earnings the following year. Moreover, results in Pourciau (1993) indicate that 
departing executives record accruals and write-offs that decrease earnings during their last year of 
tenure. Consistently with these findings, Wells (2002) reports results supporting the notion that 
new CEOs engage in an earnings bath. Overall, findings from this strand of literature suggest that 
CEO’s personal incentives, both monetary and non-monetary, play a core role in firms’ decision 
of whether playing the numbers game. 
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Despite the several mentioned contributions that analyze the relationship between CEO’s 
incentives and earnings management, there is a lack of evidence about how CEO’s incentives 
shape the trade-off among the different earnings game strategies. This lack of evidence is 
particularly important because earnings game strategies are decided and executed by the CEO of 
the company who, most likely, is going to consider in the choice among the different options also 
her personal costs and benefits. 
 Bauman et al. (2005) partially fill this gap providing evidence that, in the pre-SOX era, stock 
option compensation affects positively earnings guidance and negatively accrual-based earnings 
management, but it is still unclear the role of CEOs incentives in the post-SOX era on earnings 
game strategies. Similarly, Demers and Wang (2010) analyze the impact of CEO’s age on accrual 
and real earnings management but their study does not model a trade-off among earnings game 
strategies. Moreover, previous researches suffer a major limitation: the different numbers game 
strategies are considered one by one and there is not an attempt to analyze the trade-off among 
them as a result of CEOs incentives. Therefore, in this paper we analyze the trade-off among 
accrual-based earnings management, real activity manipulation and analysts’ expectation 
guidance, jointly considered, as a result of CEOs’ incentives. 
 
  2.3 Testable Predictions 
It’s well recognized that the intended effect of all the three earnings game strategies analyzed in 
this paper is to help firms to meet/beat benchmarks, when they are not able to do so in the normal 
course of their business operations. Nonetheless, the different strategies have several side effects 
that are likely to affect their costliness to the CEO according to her personal incentives. In the 
following, we first analyze the main side effects of each earnings game strategy and, secondly, 
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we discuss how these side effects impact on CEO’s incentives and  might influence their final 
choice about which strategy to use. 
 
Side effects of earnings game strategies 
We conjecture that among all earnings game strategies available to executives to meet/beat 
targets, real earnings management is, by far, the most costly option for the firm. In fact, real 
earnings management modifies firm’s operations making them to divert from their normal course 
without an underlying economic reason. Evidences reported in Graham et al. (2005), indicate that 
when executives engage in real earnings management they burn real cash flows and forgo 
projects with positive net present value. Specifically, results from Graham et al. (2005)’s survey 
indicate that only the 50% of managers interviewed would take a project that increases 
shareholder value if this would mean to miss consensus earnings. Moreover, the 80% of survey 
participants reported that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and 
maintenance to meet an earnings target, and more than half stated that they would delay starting a 
new project to meet a benchmark. As a consequence, the primary side effect of real earnings 
management practices is to impair the value of the firm and its ability to compete and create 
shareholder value in the next future, because of current suboptimal investment choices. A second 
side effect of real earnings management consists in decreasing discretionary investments which 
are risky and volatile by nature and that could enhance stock price volatility in the future. 
Specifically, real manipulations reduce firms’ possibility to bet on risky investment policies, such 
as investing in R&D projects. Therefore, real manipulations could potentially decrease firm’s 
future stock price volatility. 
Even if accrual-based earnings management, contrary to real earnings management, does not 
have any cash flow effects and does not modify firm’s operations, it imposes anyway risks and 
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costs on the firm, especially after the passage of the SOX in 2002. In fact, after the SOX, accrual 
manipulations are more likely to draw auditors’ and regulators’ scrutiny with the subsequent risk 
of incurring into formal sanctions, adverse publicity and legal costs in the case of questionable 
financial reporting. Academic research and the popular press argued that it became particularly 
costly for firms to engage in accrual-based earnings management activities in the Post-SOX 
period because of increased regulatory and auditing scrutiny, and because of the more stringent 
enforcement for securities regulation violations (Cohen et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009). 
The increase in fines and regulatory scrutiny implies that the expected penalty for aggressive 
financial reporting has become greater (Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Therefore, the primary side effect 
of accrual-based earnings management is to impose potential costs and risks on the firm, even if 
these costs are likely to be less detrimental for firm’s future value than those imposed by real 
earnings management because they do not affect firm’s operations. 
Finally, analysts’ guidance does not encompass a manipulation of reported earnings but acts on 
analysts’ expectations about firm’s future earnings. Therefore, this earnings game strategy neither 
interfere with firm’s business operations, nor alter accounting numbers reported to external 
investors. Thus analysts’ guidance strategies leave untouched both firm’s operations and financial 
statements. Nonetheless, when executives guide analysts provide them with additional 
information about firm’s future prospects, and in doing so they contribute to decrease asymmetry 
information in the market among investors and analysts. As a consequence, this earnings game 
strategy does not threaten firm’s value but might decrease stock price volatility.  
 
CEO’s incentives and earnings game strategies 
Our predictions are rooted in the assumption that the above mentioned side effects make the three 
earnings game strategies differently costly for CEOs according to their personal incentives. 
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Specifically, we consider three types of CEO’s incentives: equity incentives, risk related 
incentives and career concerns.  
Equity incentives are defined as the change in the value of the executive’s portfolio of stocks and 
options due to a variation in stock price (Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2003). By motivating 
executives to increase stock price, equity incentives aim at aligning CEO’s interests with those of 
shareholders, thus moderating principal-agent problems (Core et al., 2003). In fact, CEOs with 
high equity incentives are more concerned than low incentivized executives about the long-term 
value of the company which, under efficient market hypothesis, is readily incorporated in the 
stock price. As a consequence, given the discussed side effects of real manipulations, we expect 
that real earnings management is the most costly strategy for CEOs with high equity incentives. 
Similarly, given the risks linked to accrual-based earnings management in the post-SOX period, 
we expect that CEOs with high equity incentives are also reluctant to manipulate reported 
earnings, even if we expect they would prefer to manipulate accruals rather than real activities. 
On the contrary, since analysts’ expectation guidance does not produce outcomes that might 
impair the future value of the company, we conjecture that CEOs with high equity incentive 
prefer to use this earnings game strategy and we posit the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: CEO’s with high equity incentives prefer to guide analysts’ expectations rather than 
manage real operations 
H1b: CEO’s with high equity incentives prefer to guide analysts’ expectations rather than 
engage in accrual-based earnings management 
H1c: CEO’s with high equity incentives prefer to engage in accrual-based earnings management 
rather than  manage real operations 
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CEO’s risk-related incentives stem from the sensitivity of CEO’s equity portfolio to stock price 
volatility and provide executives with incentives to take risks in the attempt of increasing the 
value of their option portfolio (Core et al., 2003). Coles et al. (2006) document that higher 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility leads executives to implement riskier policy choices, 
including relatively more investment in R&D. As a consequence, we expect that CEOs 
incentivized on risk do not engage in real earnings management since this would encompass 
cutting discretionary expenditures that might boost future stock price volatility. Similarly, we 
anticipate that CEOs with high risk incentives do not use analysts’ expectation guidance 
strategies but prefer to resort to accrual-based earnings management that does not have a 
potential negative effect on firm’s stock volatility. This would also be consistent with findings in 
Grant et al. (2009) showing that that CEOs risk-taking incentives are positively related to income 
smoothing. Since we do not have an a priori conjecture about the relative preference of risk 
incentivized CEOs between real earnings management and analysts’ guidance, we posit the 
following research hypotheses: 
 
H2a: CEO’s with high risk incentives prefer to engage in accrual-based earnings management 
rather than guide analysts’ expectations 
H2b: CEO’s with high risk incentives prefer to engage in accrual-based earnings management 
rather than  manage real operations 
 
In Fama (1980)’s model, career concerns induce efficient managerial behavior that can overcome 
moral hazard problems. The argument is further explored by Holmström (1999) that develops a 
model in which learning about a qualified measure of the manager’s talent and ability occurs 
through the observation of the manager’s output. The precision of information about manager’s 
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ability typically increases as time goes on; thus the market puts more weight on the output 
observations during the early stage of the executive’s career. In fact, at the beginning of 
executive’s career the market has less information and the output observations are more 
important for inferring manager’s “type”. As a consequence, young executives have higher career 
concerns than their old colleague because they have stronger incentives to deliver positive 
outcomes to the market. Therefore, similarly to equity incentives, career concerns align CEOs 
and shareholders’ interests and make executives more prone to put efforts for delivering positive 
observable outcomes to the market. As a consequence, the above discussed side effects of real 
earnings management are particularly costly for executives with high career concerns and we 
anticipate that they use this earnings game strategy the least possible. Similarly, we expect also 
accrual-based earnings management to be costly for CEOs with high career concerns, even if to a 
lower extent than real earnings management. On the contrary, we anticipate that managers with 
high career concerns prefer to use analysts’ expectation guidance to meet/beat targets. Our 
arguments mirror those of the first hypothesis: since accrual and real earnings management 
impose potential costs and risks on firms, when it is more important for executives to preserve 
firm’s future value they use these earnings game strategies to a lower extent and prefer to guide 
analysts’ expectations. Therefore we posit the following research hypotheses: 
 
H3a: CEO’s with high career concerns prefer to guide analysts’ expectations rather than 
manage real operations 
H3b: CEO’s with high career concerns prefer to guide analysts’ expectations rather than engage 
in accrual-based earnings management 
H3c: CEO’s with high career concerns prefer to engage in accrual-based earnings management 
rather than manage real operations 
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For the sake of clarity, Figure 2.1 summarizes our hypotheses about the role of CEO’s incentives 
in the trade-off among accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management and 
analysts’ guidance. 
 
 
       Figure 2.1  Research Hypotheses 
 
2.4 Variable Measurement 
Accrual-based earnings management 
We use a cross-sectional model to calculate discretionary accruals where, for each year and 
quarter, we estimate the normal accrual model for every industry using the Modified Jones 
Model. This approach, commonly used in earnings management literature (e.g. Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010), partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions that affect 
total accruals, while allowing the coefficients to vary across time. Specifically, we start 
estimating the following cross-sectional model for each 2 digit SIC/year/quarter group: 
 
்஺೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൌ ݇ଵ
ଵ
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ݇ଶ
∆ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ݇ଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,௤   (1) 
 
CEO Incentives Worst Best
Equity Incentives Real Earnings Management
Accrual Earnings 
Management Analysts' Guidance
Risk Incentives Accrual Earnings Management
Career Concerns Real Earnings Management
Accrual Earnings 
Management Analysts' Guidance
Earnings Management Strategies
Real Earnings Management and 
Analysts' Guidance
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In the above model, for fiscal year t, quarter q, and firm i, TA represents the total accruals 
computed as the difference between i) earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations and ii) operating cash flows from continuing operations. Assets represent firm’s total 
assets, ∆SALES is the change in revenues from the preceding quarter, and PPE is the gross value 
of property, plant and equipment2.   
The coefficient estimates from (1) are then used to estimate the firm-specific normal accruals 
(NA) as follows: 
 
ܰܣ௜,௧,௤ ൌ ෠݇ଵ ଵ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ෠݇ଶ
∆ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟,೜ି∆஺ோ೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ෠݇ଷ
௉௉ா೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ   (2) 
 
Where ∆AR is the change in accounts receivables from the preceding quarter. Finally, we 
compute discretionary accruals as the difference between firm’s total accruals (scaled by total 
assets) and NA.  Kothari et al. (2005) argue that traditional accrual earnings management 
measures tend to be mis-specified because performance and estimated metrics exhibit a 
mechanical relation. In order to overcome this problem, we follow their suggestion and compute 
a performance-matched discretionary accrual metric (Accrual EM). Specifically, for each 
treatment firm in our sample, we identify a control firm in the same 2-digit SIC code, year and 
quarter, with the smallest difference in terms of ROA. Then, we compute the accrual earnings 
management metric for the treatment firm as the difference in the earnings management proxy 
between the treatment and control firm.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Following Matsumoto (2002), for firms that report a balance for PPE in the fourth fiscal quarter but report missing 
data in quarters 1-3, we compute the year-to-year change in PPE and add to each of the interim quarters a 
proportional amount of this change based on the proportion of annual depreciation incurred in that quarter. 
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Real earnings management 
We build on previous literature to develop our proxies of real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang 2012). Following Zang (2012), we focus on i) reporting lower cost of goods sold through 
increased production and ii) decreasing discretionary expenditures3. 
We first generate the normal level of discretionary expenses and production costs using the 
models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) as implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). 
Specifically we use the following model to estimate the normal level of production costs: 
 
௉ோை஽೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൌ ݇ଵ
ଵ
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ݇ଶ
ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ݇ଷ
∆ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ݇ସ
∆ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟,೜షభ
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,௤   (3) 
 
Where production costs (PROD) are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and changes in 
inventory during the quarter. Abnormal production costs (R_PROD) are defined as actual 
production costs minus normal production costs computed using the estimated coefficients from 
(3). 
Secondly, we model discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales and estimate the 
following model to derive normal levels of discretionary expenses: 
 
஽ூௌ௑೔,೟,೜
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൌ ݇ଵ
ଵ
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ݇ଶ
ௌ஺௅ாௌ೔,೟,೜షభ
஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,೟,೜షభ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,௤   (4) 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
3 Following Zang (2012) we do not examine abnormal cash flows from operations because real activities 
manipulation impacts it in different directions, and the net effect is ambiguous (see also Roychowdhury 2006) 
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Where DISX are selling, general and administrative expenses from Compustat dataset4. 
Abnormal levels of discretionary expenditures (R_DISX) are then defined as actual discretionary 
expenses minus normal discretionary expenses computed using the estimated coefficients from 
(4). Also in this case we use a performance match approach for eliminating any bias due to the 
correlation among real earnings management metrics (R_PROD and R_DISX) and firm’s 
performance. 
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), in order to capture the total effect of real 
earnings management we combine the two individual measures into one comprehensive metric of 
real earnings management (Real EM). Specifically, we first multiply abnormal discretionary 
expenses by negative one (so that the higher amount, the more likely it is that the firm is cutting 
discretionary expenditures) and add it to abnormal production costs.  
 
Analysts’ expectation guidance 
As proxy for analysts’ guidance we use the model developed and validated by Matsumoto (2002) 
which adopts a method similar to the Jones model (Jones, 1991) for computing abnormal 
accruals. Specifically, we first estimate the expected portion of analysts’ forecast by modeling the 
seasonal change in earnings as a function of  i) the prior quarter’s seasonal change in earnings 
and ii) returns cumulated over the current year: 
 
∆EPSi,j,t,q/Pi,j,t,q-4 = αj,t + β1j,t*(∆EPSi,j,t,q-1/Pi,j,t,q-5) + β2j,t*CRETi,j,t,q + εi,j,t,q        (5) 
 
 
                                                 
4 Since we are using quarterly data we follow Bartov and Cohen (2009) and focus on selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses that are available on a quarterly base. In Compustat, quarterly SG&A expenditures 
also include R&D investments.  
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where: 
∆EPSijtq is earnings per share for firm i in four-digit SIC code j in quarter q of year t, less earnings 
per share for the same firm four quarters prior (i.e. quarter t-4), as reported in I/B/E/S; 
Pijtq is price per share for firm i in four-digit SIC code j at the end of quarter q of year t, as 
reported in quarterly Compustat; 
CRETijtq is cumulative daily excess returns for firm i in four-digit SIC code j in quarter q of year t 
obtained from CRSP. Returns are cumulated from three days after the quarter q-4 
earnings announcement to 20 days before the quarter q earnings announcement. 
 
This model is estimated for each firm year using all firm-quarters in that year from the same four-
digit SIC code. Since the estimate of analysts’ expected forecast should use only data that would 
be available to analysts in making their forecast, following Matsumoto (2002) we use the 
parameter estimates from the prior firm-year to determine the expected change in EPS 
(E[ΔEPS]). We then add this value to the earnings from the same quarter in the prior year to 
obtain the expected forecast (E[F]) of the current quarter’s earnings: 
 
E[∆EPSi,j,t,q] = [ ߙො j,t-1 + ߚመ1j,t-1*(∆EPSi,j,t,q-1/Pi,j,t,q-5) + ߚመ2j,t-1*CRETi,j,t,q]* Pi,j,t,q-4    (6) 
E[Fi,j,t,q] = EPSi,j,t,q-4 + E[∆EPSi,j,t,q]    (7) 
 
Subtracting the expected forecast (computed using equation 7) from the last published consensus 
forecast for the quarter provides the unexpected portion of the forecast (UEF). We then multiply 
UEF by minus 1 (Guidance EM) so that the higher the amount, the more likely it is that the firm 
has downward guided analysts’ forecasts.  
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The trade-off among earnings game strategies 
Given our focus on the use of earnings game strategies, we test our research hypotheses in a 
setting in which earnings management is likely to occur. Specifically, we restrict our 
investigation to year-quarters in which the firm has exactly met analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecasts, or has exceeded it by one cent (suspect firms)5. Since we analyze firms’ trade-off 
decision among the three earnings management alternatives, and we do not investigate the choice 
of whether engaging in the earnings game, we create four metrics that directly analyze the trade-
off among earnings game strategies. Specifically, using the final sample of suspect firms, we sort 
the three earnings management proxies above defined (Accrual EM, Real EM, and Guidance EM) 
into deciles and create the following ratios:  
 
ܴ݈݁ܽ_ݒݏ_ܣ݈݈ ൌ  ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܴ݈݁ܽ ܧܯ ሺܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ ܧܯ ൅ ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܴ݈݁ܽ ܧܯ ൅  ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܩݑ݅݀ܽ݊ܿ݁ ܧܯሻ 
ܴ݈݁ܽ_ݒݏ_ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ ൌ  ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܴ݈݁ܽ ܧܯ ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ ܧܯ 
ܴ݈݁ܽ_ݒݏ_ܩݑ݅݀ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܴ݈݁ܽ ܧܯ ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܩݑ݅݀ܽ݊ܿ݁ ܧܯ 
  
ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ_ݒݏ_ܩݑ݅݀ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ ܧܯ ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁ ܩݑ݅݀ܽ݊ܿ݁ ܧܯ 
 
 
 
CEO’s equity incentives 
As Core et al. (2003) emphasize, executive incentives from stocks and options are properly 
measured only considering portfolio incentives. In fact, the amount of newly granted restricted 
stocks and stock options is not sufficient for evaluating the amount of incentives the executive is 
provided with (Yermack, 1995). We measure CEO’s equity incentives (Equity Incentives) using 
                                                 
5 We focus on analysts’ forecasts both because Brown and Caylor (2005) show that, in recent years, managers seek 
to avoid negative quarterly earnings surprises more than to avoid missing other targets, and because analysts’ 
earnings forecast is the only target that can be reached using all the three earnings game strategies under 
investigation. 
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of the incentive ratio computed as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006, 519-520). We start 
computing the dollar change in the value of executive’s stock and option holdings that would 
come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price (ONEPCT). In order to 
estimate the Delta of CEO’s option portfolio we follow Core and Guay (2002)’s methodology. In 
particular, CEO’s options are divided into three groups (options awarded during the year, options 
awarded in previous years but not yet exercisable and options granted in previous years and 
currently exercisable) and separate estimates of the delta are computed6. Core and Guay (2002) 
show that their proxy captures more than 99% of the variation in option portfolio value and 
sensitivity. Starting from 2006, Execucomp reports all the necessary data for directly computing 
the delta of CEO’s option portfolio, thus eliminating the need of using Core and Guay (2002)’s 
approximation. Secondly, ONEPCT is standardized by the amount of cash compensation7 
received by the executive during the fiscal year as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).  
 
CEO’s risk incentives 
We measure CEO risk-related incentives (Risk Incentives) in a methodology similar to that used 
by Rogers (2002, 2005) and Grant et al. (2009), namely the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided 
by their Delta. This is consistent with Core et al. (2003), claiming that risk taking is a second-
order effect in option compensation since the incentives to increase stock price dominates the 
incentive to take risk. We therefore examine the role on earnings game strategies of this second-
order effect with respect to the first-order one. We compute CEO’s option Vega as the sensitivity 
of CEO’s option holding to a unit change in stock price volatility by using the first derivative of 
                                                 
6 Appendix A reports the formula used for computing the sensitivity of individual stock options to changes in stock 
price. 
7 Cash compensation is defined as the sum of base salary and annual bonuses. 
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the Black-Scholes option-pricing model in relation to firm’s volatility8. The Delta is instead 
computed taking the partial derivative of the Black-Scholes equation with respect to stock price. 
As described in the previous paragraph, when necessary we used Core and Guay (2002)’s 
methodology to retrieve the data for computing options’ Vega and Delta. 
 
CEO’s career concerns  
Consistently with our research framework, we proxy for CEO’s career concerns using CEO’s age 
as disclosed in Execucomp. Since old CEOs have lower career concerns than young executives, 
we create the variable Career Concerns that is equal to CEO’s age multiplied by minus one. 
Thus, a positive coefficient on Career Concerns indicates that CEOs with high career concerns 
(young CEOs) engage more in a given earnings game strategy than executives with low career 
concerns (old CEOs). 
 
 
Control variables 
We include in our models several control variables that previous literature has shown to influence 
earnings game strategies (e.g. Zang, 2012). 
Log Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets and proxies for firm’s size; Cycle is the length 
of the operating cycle computed as in Dechow (1994) and it is an underlying determinant of the 
variability of working capital; M_B is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity, and it proxies for growth opportunities; Z Score is Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 2000) 
which proxies for a firm’s financial health; Market Share is  firm’s market share computed as the 
ratio of a company’s total sales to the total sales of its three-digit SIC code industry in a given 
year-quarter; NOA is firm’s net operating assets (i.e. shareholders’ equity less cash and 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A 
50 
 
marketable securities plus total debt) standardized by total assets; BIG 4 is an indicator variables 
that takes the value of 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big 4, zero otherwise; Tenure Auditor is the number 
of years the auditor has audited the firm; ROA is operating profits divided by total assets; Tenure 
CEO is a dummy variable that takes on value of 1 if CEO’s tenure is greater or equal to 3, and 
zero otherwise. This is consistent with Fredrickson et al. (1988) that argue that early vulnerability 
occurs when CEO tenure is less than, or equal to, three years, while after three years CEOs start 
gaining power and becoming more entrenched. 
 
2.5  Empirical Analyses 
Sample selection 
We start with 348,998 firm-quarter observations from Compustat over the period 2003-2010. 
Following a common practice in earnings management literature (see Roychowdhury, 2006) we 
exclude firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 5000) and banks and 
financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500), losing 73,176 firm-quarters. We 
subsequently delete 99,288 and 25,385 firm-quarters with missing data on Compustat for 
computing accrual and real earnings management metrics. Then, we merge Compustat database 
with I/B/E/S dataset and lose 98,537 firm-year quarters with no full data for computing analyst 
expectations’ guidance. Finally, we merge Compustat and I/B/E/S datasets with Execucomp, 
deleting 24,749 firm quarters with no data on all CEO’s incentives and further 871 firm-quarters 
with missing control variables. Restricting the sample to suspect firms leads a final sample of 
4,471 firm-quarter observations generated from 1,088 unique firms. Table 2.1 provides a tabular 
representation of the sample selection process and describes the distribution of observations for 
fiscal quarter and year.  
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Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. Since deciles 
distributions are not informative, we report the row values of earnings management proxies 
Panel A
Firm-quarter observation in Compustat (2003-2010) 348,998  
minus
SIC codes from 6000 to 6500 and from 4400 to 5000 73,176    
Missing data for computing discretionary accruals 99,288    
Missing data for computing real earnings management 25,385    
Missing data for computing analysts' guidance 98,537    
Missing data from Execucomp on the CEO 24,749    
Missing data on other control variables 817         
No suspect firms (|FE| <= 0.01) 22,575    
Final Sample 4,471      
Unique firms 1,088      
Panel B
Quarter Freq. Percent Cum.
1 1,129 25% 25%
2 1,151 26% 51%
3 1,062 24% 75%
4 1,129 25% 100%
Total 4,471 100%
Panel C
Year Freq. % % Cum.
2003 835 19% 19%
2004 686 15% 34%
2005 616 14% 48%
2006 428 10% 57%
2007 618 14% 71%
2008 494 11% 82%
2009 410 9% 91%
2010 384 9% 100%
Total 4,471 100%
TABLE 2.1
Sample Selection and Composition
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(Accrual EM, Real EM, Guidance EM). All values appear to be into reasonable ranges and are 
comparable with those of previous studies. Specifically, the median incentive ratio is 0.23 with 
substantial variability among CEOs, while options’ second-order effect represents in median the 
57% of the first-order effect. The median CEO is 55 years old and holds the position for more 
than three years. Firm characteristics show that our sample (as it is usual when dealing with 
Execucomp database) is made by large and profitable firms, with high growth opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients among the main variables included in the 
analysis. 
N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
CEO Incentives
Equity Incentives 4,471 0.292 0.225 0.122 0.229 0.396
Risk Incentives 4,471 0.637 0.442 0.363 0.566 0.805
Career Concerns 4,471 -54.746 7.239 -60.000 -55.000 -50.000
N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Numbers Game Strategies
Accural EM 4,471 -0.007 0.059 -0.035 -0.004 0.024
Real EM 4,471 -0.005 0.079 -0.046 -0.004 0.037
Guidance EM 4,471 -0.007 0.144 -0.079 -0.006 0.065
N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Controls
Log Assets 4,471 7.115 1.440 6.082 6.956 8.010
Cycle 4,471 119.590 72.338 67.682 105.858 154.384
M_B 4,471 3.373 2.954 1.735 2.645 4.055
Z Score 4,471 4.875 5.293 1.895 3.292 5.887
Market Share 4,471 0.064 0.112 0.002 0.016 0.073
NOA 4,471 0.809 0.183 0.717 0.870 0.957
Big 4 4,471 0.931 0.254 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tenure Auditor 4,471 12.427 9.013 6.000 10.000 17.000
ROA 4,471 0.015 0.021 0.007 0.015 0.025
Tenure CEO 4,471 0.642 0.480 0.000 1.000 1.000
TABLE 2.2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable definition in Appendix 2.B. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Equity Incentives 1
2 Risk Incentives -0.281*** 1
3 Career Concerns -0.063*** 0.046** 1
4 Accural EM -0.030* 0.005 -0.036* 1
5 Real EM -0.076*** -0.001 -0.067*** 0.119*** 1
6 Guidance EM 0.083*** -0.090*** 0.022 -0.001 -0.034* 1
7 Log Assets 0.156*** 0.228*** -0.096*** -0.029 0.056*** -0.009 1
8 Cycle -0.043** 0.058*** -0.069*** -0.028 -0.131*** 0.060*** -0.022 1
9 M_B 0.281*** -0.101*** 0.007 -0.021 -0.097*** 0.063*** 0.067*** -0.062*** 1
10 Z Score 0.303*** -0.216*** 0.034* -0.071*** -0.076*** 0.096*** -0.251*** 0.110*** 0.271*** 1
11 Market Share 0.041** 0.088*** -0.100*** 0.025 0.101*** -0.087*** 0.437*** -0.145*** 0.087*** -0.159*** 1
12 NOA -0.170*** 0.143*** -0.164*** 0.099*** 0.154*** -0.084*** 0.312*** -0.038* -0.119*** -0.460*** 0.260*** 1
13 Big 4 -0.006 0.069*** -0.014 -0.039** -0.003 -0.002 0.279*** -0.023 0.003 -0.082*** 0.079*** 0.066*** 1
14 Tenure Auditor -0.031* 0.160*** -0.096*** 0.017 0.022 0.003 0.278*** 0.049** -0.045** -0.102*** 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.155*** 1
15 ROA 0.213*** -0.164*** -0.043** 0.010 -0.043** -0.020 0.069*** -0.051*** 0.340*** 0.394*** 0.119*** -0.007 -0.022 0.025 1
16 Tenure CEO 0.286*** -0.149*** -0.221*** 0.005 0.020 0.026 -0.080*** 0.025 -0.009 0.075*** -0.060*** -0.010 -0.039** -0.054*** 0.069***
The Table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Variable definition in Appendix 2.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 2.3
Correlation Matrix
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 As expected there is a negative correlation between CEO’s equity and risk incentives since the 
measure of risk incentives adjusts, at the denominator, for the sensitivity of CEO’s option 
portfolio to changes in stock price. CEO’s career concerns are negatively associated with CEO’s 
equity incentives since young executives have smaller equity portfolios than their old colleagues. 
Finally, since executives holding the CEO position for a long time have more firm’s stocks and 
options in their portfolios than new executives, there is a positive correlation between CEO’s 
equity incentives and CEO’s tenure. 
 
Univariate Analysis 
Jointly considered, our research hypotheses conjecture that real earnings management is the most 
costly earnings game strategy for CEOs with high equity incentives, risk incentives and career 
concerns, and thus highly incentivized executives prefer to substitute it with other alternatives 
(see Figure 2.1). Table 2.4 classifies observations into quintiles according to the level of CEO’s 
incentives and tabulates, for each group, the mean level of the variable Real_vs_All. Consistently 
with H1 and H3, univariate results show that the higher the CEO’s equity incentives (Panel A) 
and career concerns (Panel C), the lower the amount of real earnings management used by the 
company with respect to the overall earnings management activity undertaken. On the contrary, 
results from Table 2.4, Panel B, do not provide evidence that CEOs with high risk incentives 
engage less in real earnings management with respect to CEOs with low risk incentives. In the 
following we test our hypotheses in a multivariate setting and consider the presence of 
endogeneity between CEO’s compensation structure and earnings game strategies. 
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Multivariate Analysis 
In our research setting, endogeneity is likely to be an issue because compensation structure and 
reporting strategies are jointly determined by the firm. We assume that earnings game strategies 
can be presented in the following form: 
Panel A Real_vs_All
Equity Incentives Quintile Median
Lowest 0.347
2nd quintile 0.335
3rd quintile 0.335
4th quintile 0.335
Highest 0.306
H0: Lowest - Highest = 0 z = 5.819 p-value = 0.000
Panel B Real_vs_All
Risk Incentives Quintile Median
Lowest 0.318
2nd quintile 0.332
3rd quintile 0.332
4th quintile 0.339
Highest 0.336
H0: Lowest - Highest = 0 z = -2.424 p-value = 0.015
Panel C Real_vs_All
Career Concerns Quintile Median
Lowest 0.337
2nd quintile 0.343
3rd quintile 0.333
4th quintile 0.329
Highest 0.313
H0: Lowest - Highest = 0 z =  3.459 p-value = 0.000
Variable definition in Appendix 2.B. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 2.4
CEO's Incentives and Earnings Game: Univariate Analysis
The table reports the mean value of the variable Real_vs_All
according to the quintile of the distribution of CEO’s equity
incentives (Panel A), CEO’s risk incentives (Panel B), and CEO’s
career concerns (Panel C).
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Earnings management strategies = f(equity incentives, risk incentives, career concerns, control 
variables)                                                                                                                                      (A) 
 
 
To control for the endogeneity of equity and risk incentives, our research design uses a system of 
simultaneous equations by adding the following to (A): 
 
Equity incentives = f(industry equity incentives, control variables)                                             (B)                             
Risk incentives    = f(industry risk incentives, control variables)                                                 (C) 
 
In this system of simultaneous equations, equation (A) measures the trade-off among earnings 
game strategies given the CEO’s incentives. These, in turn, are specified in (B) and (C) using as 
instrument for CEO’s equity (risk) incentives of firm i in year t, the mean of the equity (risk) 
incentives provided, in year t, to all CEOs of firms belonging to firm i’s 2-digits sic code9. The 
underlying motivation of using these two instruments is that compensation structures tend to be 
correlated inside given industries (Murphy, 1999) but, arguably, the industry compensation 
structure is not related to the reporting strategy of a specific firm. We estimate equations (A), (B), 
and (C) through three-stage least square (3SLS). Table 2.5 reports results using Real_vs_All as 
dependent variable in equation (A). The negative and statistically significant coefficients on 
CEO’s equity incentives and career concerns corroborate results from the univariate analysis and, 
consistently with our research hypotheses, suggest that CEOs with high equity incentives and 
career concerns tend to substitute real earnings management with other alternatives. It is 
important to note that, consistently with our research framework, the variable Real_vs_All does 
not capture the total amount of earnings management but it proxies for the relative use of real 
earnings management with respect to overall earnings management activity.  
                                                 
9 We excluded firm i from the computation. 
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Dependent variable:
Equity Incentives -1.145***
[-4.746]
Risk Incentives -0.046
[-0.366]
Career Concerns -0.002*** -0.001 0.003***
[-3.753] [-1.612] [3.832]
Log Assets 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.046***
[5.331] [19.117] [9.655]
Cycle -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
[-6.173] [-3.830] [3.520]
M_B 0.009*** 0.012*** -0.004*
[2.614] [11.517] [-1.679]
Z Score 0.011*** 0.010*** -0.007***
[3.939] [14.543] [-4.701]
Market Share 0.123*** 0.009 -0.024
[3.968] [0.316] [-0.408]
NOA -0.043 -0.136*** 0.076**
[-1.046] [-7.355] [2.068]
Big 4 -0.042** -0.035*** 0.041*
[-2.546] [-3.000] [1.775]
Tenure Auditor -0.001* -0.001*** 0.003***
[-1.958] [-3.041] [4.806]
ROA -0.075 0.191 -2.363***
[-0.219] [1.182] [-7.363]
Tenure CEO 0.149*** 0.133*** -0.094***
[4.045] [21.788] [-7.756]
Equity Incentives Industry 0.661***
[12.324]
Risk Incentives Industry 0.655***
[31.795]
Year Dummies YES NO NO
Quarter Dummies YES NO NO
Industry Dummies YES NO NO
Observations 4,471 4,471 4,471
The table reports 3SLS estimate results for equations A, B, and C. Variable definition in
Appendix 2.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
P-values are two tailed. z-statistics in brackets.
TABLE 2.5
CEO's Incentives and Earnings Game: Multivariate Analysis
Real_vs_All
 Eq. A
Equity Incentives 
 Eq. B
Risk Incentives
 Eq. C
3SLS
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The insignificant coefficient on CEO’s risk incentives confirms results from the univariate 
analysis and indicates that CEO’s risk incentives do not make executives less likely to resort to 
real earnings management. 
In order to directly investigate the order of preference hypothesized among the three earnings 
game strategies, we estimate equations A, B, and C using as dependent variable in equation A the 
proxies Real_vs_Guidance, Accrual_vs_Guidance, and Real_vs_Accrual. In fact, these variables 
compare earnings game strategies two by two, and allow us to shed lights on their trade-off. 
Specifically, given our research hypotheses, we expect the following coefficients on CEO’s 
incentive metrics in equation A: 
 
 
   
 Figure 2.2. The trade-off among earnings game strategies 
 
 
Three-stage least-square estimates for equation A are reported in Table 2.6. For the sake of 
brevity we do not report results from equations B and C, which are similar to those presented in 
Table 2.5. Consistently with H1a, H1b and H1c, coefficients on CEO’s equity incentives are 
negative and statistically significant across the three earnings management metrics analyzed.  
CEO Incentives Real_vs_Guidance Accrual_vs_Guidance Real_vs_Accrual
Equity Incentives ― ― ―
Risk Incentives ? + ―
Career Concerns ― ― ―
Earnings Management Metrics
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Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Equity Incentives -13.794*** -11.112*** -20.271***
[-4.494] [-3.743] [-7.238]
Risk Incentives -1.700 3.225** -1.070
[-1.065] [2.081] [-0.734]
Career Concerns -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.023***
[-2.586] [-3.756] [-3.177]
Log Assets 0.738*** 0.351*** 1.029***
[5.197] [2.586] [7.883]
Cycle -0.003*** -0.002** -0.005***
[-3.515] [-2.449] [-5.324]
M_B 0.122*** 0.143*** 0.237***
[2.760] [3.347] [5.875]
Z Score 0.122*** 0.114*** 0.213***
[3.324] [3.188] [6.350]
Market Share 2.183*** 0.845** 0.737**
[5.470] [2.210] [1.960]
NOA -0.541 -1.056** -2.328***
[-1.046] [-2.100] [-4.905]
Big 4 -0.307 -0.527*** -0.647***
[-1.457] [-2.592] [-3.321]
Tenure Auditor -0.009 -0.015** -0.019***
[-1.193] [-2.137] [-2.894]
ROA -0.094 14.227*** -5.565
[-0.021] [3.352] [-1.384]
Tenure CEO 1.715*** 1.674*** 2.622***
[3.653] [3.668] [6.134]
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Quarter Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 4,471 4,471 4,471
TABLE 2.6
Disentangling the Effects of CEO's Incentives on Earnings Game Strategies
The table reports 3SLS estimate results for equations A simultaneously estimated with equations B
and C (untabulated). Variable definition in Appendix 2.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed. z-statistics in brackets.
                                                   3SLS
Real_vs_AccrualReal_vs_Guidance Accrual_vs_Guidance
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Specifically, results indicate that CEOs with high equity incentives prefer to guide analysts’ 
expectations (column 1) or engage in accrual-based earnings management (column 3) rather than 
manipulating firm’s business operations, thus supporting H1a and H1c. The negative coefficient 
on CEO’s equity incentives in column 2 also confirms H1b, and indicates that CEOs with high 
equity incentives prefer to guide analysts rather than managing accruals. 
Consistently with the univariate analysis, Table 2.6 only provides partial support for H2. 
Specifically, the positive and significant coefficient on CEO’s risk incentives in column 2 
confirms that CEOs with high risk-incentives prefer to manage accruals instead of guiding 
analysts’ expectations (H2a), while the statistically insignificant coefficient in column 3 does not 
support the conjecture that risk-incentives, stemming from stock option holding, prevent CEOs 
from managing real operations (H2b). This result can be due to the fact that risk-related 
incentives  might only prevent cutting certain types of discretionary investments (e.g. long-term 
R&D) while they do not have any effects on cutting other expenditures (e.g. employee training) 
that determine real earnings management metrics. 
As expected, coefficients on CEO’s career concerns mirror those of CEO’s equity incentives and 
support H3a, H3b, and H3c. Specifically, results suggest that CEOs with high career concerns 
prefer i) to guide analysts as first choice, ii) to manage accruals as second option, and iii) to 
manipulate real activities as last available alternative. 
 
Additional Analyses 
 
The previous analyses suggest that CEOs with high equity incentives and high career concerns 
consider real earnings management the most costly earning game strategy and try to avoid it. Our 
research framework assumes that this result is due to the fact that real earnings management, 
contrary to accrual-based earnings management and analysts’ expectation guidance, modifies 
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firm’s operations and thus decreases firm’s future shareholder value. Executives whose interests 
are more aligned with those of shareholders, in terms of equity incentives and career concerns, 
incorporate this cost to a larger extent than CEOs with low incentives, and use less real 
manipulations to meet/beat benchmarks. 
In this section of the paper we empirically test this underlying assumption, by analyzing if firms 
engaging in real manipulations have lower future performances with respect to companies that 
adopt other earnings game strategies. Specifically, we analyze the economic consequences of 
using real earnings management rather than accrual earnings management or analysts’ guidance 
by focusing on future market performance, which is a direct measure of shareholder value. 
In our empirical analysis we consider the presence of potential engogeneity both between CEO’s 
compensation and earnings game strategies, as well as between earnings game strategies and 
firm’s market performance. In fact, executives are likely to decide current earnings game 
strategies considering firm’s future performance prospects, thus raising potential endogeneity 
problems. Specifically, we model firm’s future market performance as follows: 
  
Future market performance = f(earnings management strategies, control variables)               (D) 
                                                                                                            
 
and to control for endogeneity we add the following equations to (D): 
 
Earnings management strategies = f(equity incentives, risk incentives, career concerns, control 
variables)                                                                                                                                      (A) 
Equity incentives = f(industry equity incentives, control variables)                                            (B)                     
Risk incentives    = f(industry risk incentives, control variables)                                                (C)  
 
Table 2.7 reports results for equation (D) obtained by estimating the simultaneous equation 
system made by equations (D), (A), (B) and (C) through 3SLS. In order to investigate the effect 
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of using real earnings management rather than accrual-based earnings management or analysts’ 
expectation guidance, we use as independent variable in (D) the variable Real_vs_All. Instead, for 
analyzing the persistence of effects documented we use as dependent variable in (D) firm’s 
market returns cumulated one quarter ahead (Returns Q+1), two quarters ahead (Returns Q+2), 
three quarters ahead (Returns Q+3), and four quarters ahead (Returns Q+4)10. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Note that market returns at Q+2 also include market returns at Q+1, as well as, market returns at Q+3 also include 
market returns at Q+1 and Q + 2, and so on. 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real_vs_All -0.351*** -0.561*** -0.543*** -0.380***
[-4.593] [-5.116] [-4.148] [-2.606]
Log Assets -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.024***
[-3.512] [-4.117] [-4.994] [-5.962]
M_B -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010***
[-4.615] [-4.677] [-4.636] [-4.275]
Z Score -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.007***
[-4.070] [-3.359] [-4.135] [-4.412]
Cash Flow 0.110** 0.162** 0.205*** 0.224**
[2.438] [2.519] [2.607] [2.531]
Growth -0.006 -0.030 -0.013 -0.038
[-0.298] [-1.003] [-0.355] [-0.905]
Leverage 0.010 0.018 0.012 -0.008
[0.487] [0.581] [0.319] [-0.188]
Observations 4,377 4,376 4,358 4,328
The table reports 3SLS estimate results for equations D simultaneously estimated with equations A, B
and C (untabulated). Returns (Q+x) is firm’s cumulated market returns x quarters ahead.
Variable definition in Appendix 2.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively. P-values are two tailed. z-statistics in brackets.
Returns (Q+4)
3SLS
TABLE 2.7
EG Strategies and Future Market Performance
Returns (Q+1) Returns (Q+2) Returns (Q+3)
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The negative and statistically significant coefficients on Real_vs_All, throughout Table 2.7, 
provide support for our conjecture that real manipulation is the most costly earnings game 
strategy for shareholders, since it is systematically negatively associated with future market 
performance. This is consistent with findings reported in Graham et al. (2005), showing that 
when executives engage in real activity manipulations they are willing to take economic actions 
that could have negative long-term consequences and that sacrifice long-term value. Interestingly, 
the magnitude of the coefficients on Real_vs_All indicates that the negative impact of real 
manipulations follow a parabolic pattern, thus suggesting that the effects of real manipulations 
are persistent overtime but they are particularly strong after one quarter11.  
Results presented, therefore, suggest that equity and career incentives are effective in aligning 
CEOs’ behavior and shareholders’ interests, since they prevent CEOs from managing firm’s 
operations with the subsequent documented negative effects on shareholder value.  
 
2.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Performance matched earnings management measures 
Since Kothari et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2011) argued that traditional accrual and real 
earnings management measures tend to be mis-specified we used a performance matched 
approach in the main analyses. Nonetheless, for testing the robustness of our results to alternative 
earnings management proxies we conduct our analyses using the raw earnings management 
metrics (i.e. without performance match) and results are qualitatively similar to those reported. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Results are robust to including industry/year/quarter fixed effects also in D, as well as using abnormal market 
returns as dependent variables. 
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Suspect firms 
Since our research framework assumes that firms engage in the earnings game in order to 
meet/beat earnings targets, we conducted our investigation focusing on suspect firms, as 
commonly defined in the literature. Nonetheless, this conservative approach reduces our final 
sample. Thus, we tried to repeat the analysis using the full sample of observations and results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported.  
 
Endogeneity between CEO’s incentives and future market performance 
In equation (D) we do not include CEO’s incentives among the independent variables. Since 
3SLS estimates might be particularly sensitive to the inclusions/exclusion of regressors which are 
modeled as endogenous in the system, we estimate equations A, B, C, and D including in D also 
CEO’s equity incentives, risk incentives and career concerns. Untabulated results show that the 
coefficient on the variable Real_vs_All continues to be negative and statistically significant 
across all model specifications. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Literature has shown that the market rewards firms meeting or beating earnings expectations 
(Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2005). Companies that are not able to meet earnings 
targets in the normal course of their operations may engage in the “earnings game” making 
choices among three non exclusive strategies: i) accrual-based earnings management, 2) real 
activity manipulation, and 3) analysts’ expectation guidance. These strategies are not equivalent 
in terms of costs imposed on the firm because real earnings management, contrary to accrual-
based earnings management and analysts’ expectation guidance, makes firm’s real operations to 
deviate from their normal course without an underlying economic reason and therefore it might 
65 
 
impair firm’s future performance. Previous literature showed that both the introduction of the 
SOX in 2002, and firm-related characteristics, influence the relative costliness of the different 
earnings game strategies available to managers to meet/beat targets. 
Using a sample of quarterly observations from U.S. firms over the period 2003-2010, we show 
that institutional environment and firm’s characteristics are not the only determinants of the 
trade-off among earnings game strategies. In fact, we find evidence that CEOs trade off the 
different strategies also according to their personal benefits and costs. Specifically, we document 
that CEOs with high equity incentives and high career concerns are more likely to substitute real 
activity manipulations with other earnings management strategies, with respect to executives 
with low incentives. We also analyze the economic impact of the different earnings game 
strategies and find that when firms use real earnings management rather than accrual-based 
earnings management or analysts’ guidance, they experience lower future market performance. 
Results, therefore, confirm our conjecture that this earnings game strategy imposes particularly 
high costs on firms. Equity incentives, as well as, career concerns are thus effective in aligning 
CEOs and shareholders’ interests since they prevent executives from manipulating real 
operations with subsequent negative effects on shareholder value. 
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APPENDIX 2. A 
Estimates of a stock option’s sensitivity to stock price are calculated based on the Black-Scholes 
(1973) formula for valuing European call options, as modified to account for dividend payout by 
Merton (1973). 
Option value = [S ݁ିௗ்N(Z) - X݁ି௥்N(Z – σ T(1/2)] 
 
Where 
Z = [ln(S/X) + T (r – d + σ2/2]/σT(1/2) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
r = risk-free interest rate 
d = expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price is defined as: 
[ߜሺ݋݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ሻ/ߜሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ሻሿ כ ሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁/100ሻ ൌ  ݁ିௗ் כ ܰሺܼሻ כ ሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁/100ሻ 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock price volatility is defined as: 
[ߜሺ݋݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ሻ/ߜሺݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕሻሿ כ 0.01 ൌ  ݁ିௗ் כ ܰԢሺܼሻ כ ܵTଵ/ଶ כ 0.01 
 
where N’ is the normal density function. 
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APPENDIX 2. B  
Variable Definition 
Equity Incentives  Dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price, standardized by cash compensation 
Risk Incentives Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta 
Career Concerns  CEO's age multiplied by minus 1 
Accrual EM   Performance-matched  signed discretional accruals computed using the Modified Jones Model 
Real EM Performance-matched abnormal production costs plus performance-matched abnormal discretionary expenses 
(multiplied by negative one), both of them computed as in Roychowdhury (2006) 
Guidance EM  Unexpected portion of analysts' forecast computed as in Matsumoto (2002) multiplied by negative one 
Real_vs_All  [Decile Real EM/(Decile Accrual EM + Decile Real EM +  Decile Guidance EM)] 
Real_vs_Guidance  (Decile Real EM/ Decile Guidance EM) 
Accrual_vs_Guidance  (Decile Accrual EM /Decile Guidance EM) 
Real_vs_Accrual  (Decile Real EM/ Decile Accrual EM) 
Log Assets  Natural logarithm of total assets  
Cycle Length of the operating cycle computed as in Dechow (1994) 
M_B Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
Z Score  Altman (2000)’s Z-score 
Market Share  Firm’s market share computed as the ratio of a company’s total sales to the total sales of its three-digit SIC code 
industry in a given year-quarter 
NOA Firm’s net operating assets (i.e. shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities plus total debt) 
standardized by total assets 
BIG 4 Indicator variables that takes the value of 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big 4, zero otherwise 
Tenure Auditor  Number of years the auditor has audited the firm 
ROA Operating profits divided by total assets 
Tenure CEO  Dummy variable that takes on value of 1 if CEO’s tenure is greater or equal to 3 and zero otherwise.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Privatized Returns and Socialized Risks: 
CEO Incentives, Securitization Accounting and 
the Financial Crisis 
with Antonio Parbonetti 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
From 2000 to 2006 the amount of loans securitized almost doubled while the securitization of 
risky subprime mortgages grew by almost eight times, exceeding 800 billion US dollars at the 
end of 2006.  Whether highly incentivized CEOs foresaw in securitizations under US GAAP an 
opportunity for hiding risks while bearing them, and generating profits and cash flows because of 
the risks, is an open issue that this paper is going to explore. 
Securitizations transform illiquid assets into liquid securities and transactions that qualify for sale 
accounting offer several benefits that make them particularly appealing to originators. First, 
securitization enables financial institutions to optimally choose their exposure to the credit risk of 
loans generated (Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Second, securitization enables banks to replace 
illiquid loans with cash, improving banks’ liquidity. Third, financial institutions subject to 
regulatory capital requirements trough securitizations increase regulatory capital ratios and free 
up regulatory capital. Fourth, securitization allows banks to increase their profitability through 
“gains on sale”.  
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However, financial intermediation theories point out severe concerns over the effects of such 
transactions. A single lender has strong incentives to monitor stemming from holding illiquid 
loans on its balance sheet, while separating loans’ originator and the bearer of loans’ default risk 
might induce lax screening (Diamond, 1984). Consistently, the recent financial crisis has shown a 
large rate of delinquencies among the heavily securitized non-agency mortgages. Additionally, 
securitization generates frictions (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). The transferor of loans has 
superior information with respect to the transferee and this creates moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems.  Rajan (2006, p. 500) adds to those concerns the idea that the changes in the 
financial sector have altered managerial incentives, which in turn have altered the nature of risks 
undertaken by the system, with potential distortions.  
Understanding the determinants of risk taking behaviors in the banking industry, and the role of 
equity and risk taking incentives, is of prominent importance because several factors that are 
unique to this setting affect risk-taking strategies. 
First, financial institution being highly levered have incentives to engage in excess risk-taking, as 
shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Second, financial institutions raise debts through 
depositors or the direct access to Central Banks and, as a consequence, the increase in the level of 
risk does not necessarily translate into an increase in the cost of debt. Typically, depositors are 
small uninformed investors with deposits insured by the government as thus they lack the 
incentives and the abilities to monitor bank investments’ decision and risk profile. Third, because 
the failure of one bank may generate a contagion effect, governments provide both explicit and 
implicit guarantees. As a consequence, the debt markets do not adjust the terms of their credit to 
account for the change in the bank risk profile. Consistent with this view, Haldane (2011) 
documents that in the pre-crisis period the credit default swap markets did not distinguish strong 
from weak banks.  
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Therefore, given the absence of debt markets constrain in the level of risk, risk incentives 
stemming from stock and option compensation might have a free reign in banks. This problem is 
further exacerbated if accounting regimes reduce the efficacy of capital adequacy requirements 
aimed at limiting risk taking behaviors.  
To address our research questions we collect data from 10-K filings on the percentage of loans 
securitized and the amount of losses recorded on these loans for a sample of US financial 
institutions for the period 2003-2009. Moreover, we retrieve data on the financial institutions 
most involved in the securitization of subprime loans from a proprietary database that collects 
information on issuer of subprime securitizations in the US. We conduct our analysis in four 
steps, each of which speaking to the role of CEO’s equity and risk incentives in boosting 
securitizations and in motivating executives to transfers risks to outside investors. In our research 
design we control for CEO’s incentives being potentially endogenous with respect to 
securitization using a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) approach.  
In the first set of analyses, we investigate the association between CEO’s equity and risk 
incentives and total securitization. We document that CEOs with high levels of equity incentives 
engaged more in securitizations than executives with low equity incentives. This finding suggests 
that CEOs foresaw in securitizations under US GAAP an opportunity to boost stock price by 
generating cash flow, enhancing profits and/or freeing up regulatory capital. In the second set of 
analyses, we shift our focus from banks’ decision to engage in securitizations to the quality of the 
assets transferred and the choice of opportunistically transferring off balance the risks generated. 
We document that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives engaged to a larger extent in the 
securitization of risky loans than low incentivized executives, and they transferred risk to outside 
investors by moving off-balance the riskiest loans. These results are consistent with the fact that 
securitization allowed CEOs to engage in risky lending activities and subsequently hiding the 
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risks generated from the books, thus offering the opportunity to reduce the perceived risk while 
betting on it. Third, in order to provide further insights on the opportunistic behavior of CEOs 
when transferring risks off-balance, we investigate the relation between CEO’s incentives and the 
level of disclosure linked to securitization transactions. We find that CEO’s risk incentives are 
negatively related to the quality of securitization disclosure. This result suggests that CEOs 
incentivized on risk were less prone to provide information on the quality of loans transferred off-
balance. This finding further corroborates the idea that risk incentives have motivated CEOs to 
opportunistically take advantage from information asymmetry generated by securitization 
transactions. Fourth, we document that before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 
2007, financial institutions involved in the securitization of subprime loans largely over 
performed other banks in terms of stock returns and accounting earnings. On the contrary, 
starting from 2007, subprime securitizers recorded worse performances than other financial 
institutions that were not involved in subprime securitization. Moreover, subprime securitizers 
were able to distribute more dividends than the peers. This is consistent with the fact that by 
securitizing risky loans banks were successful in boosting stock prices, increasing earnings and 
allowing dividend distribution, but the risks undertaken turned out to be extremely costly.  
This paper contributes to several research streams. First, we contribute to the debate about 
compensation and risk taking in financial institutions showing that highly incentivized CEOs 
have used securitization to hide risks while betting on them. At the best of our knowledge this is 
the first paper that provide evidence that compensating CEOs of financial institutions as CEOs of 
industrial companies might be detrimental, supporting John et al. (2000, p. 97) analytical model 
which purports for “a prominent role for managerial compensation in bank regulation”. Second, 
we add to the emerging research strand investigating the role of CEO’s compensation in the 
financial crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) provide evidence that banks where CEOs had high 
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equity incentives performed significantly worse during the crisis than banks where CEOs had low 
incentives. We complement this result as we show that CEOs with high equity incentives 
systematically engaged in securitization transactions to a larger extent than CEOs with low levels 
of equity compensation and that they also securitized risky loans such as subprime mortgages. 
Third, we add to the growing research stream analyzing the determinants and effects of 
securitization transactions (Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Dechow and Shakespeare 
2009; Dechow et al. 2010; Amiram et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2012). We 
contribute to this debate by focusing the analysis on the financial industry and documenting the 
relationship existing between CEO’s equity compensation and securitization transactions. We 
therefore bring into the research framework direct evidence about one of the fundamental causes 
underlying securitization transactions that have been overlooked by previous literature. Fourth, at 
the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to formally investigate the level of disclosure 
linked to securitization transactions as a proxy for CEO’s opportunistic behaviors. 
Concluding, our results answer to the increasing demand for evidence on the role of CEO’s 
incentives on the financial crisis that led economists to claims that “we're all paying now because 
skewed financial incentives led to too many big bets” (Solomon and Paletta, 2009). 
 
3.2 Background 
 
Asset securitization consists in converting illiquid assets, usually small loans that could 
not be separately sold, into liquid securities (ABSs) that are sold to investors in the financial 
market. By dividing, repackaging and distributing risks within the financial system securitizations 
transform risks into an “easily tradable commodity” (Haldane 2008, p. 32) triggering a shift from 
the traditional “originating and holding” banking business model to the “originating and selling” 
model.  
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The securitization process, illustrated in Figure 3.1, substitutes the close relationship 
between borrower and lender with a long chain which starts when the originator, typically a 
commercial bank or another financial institution, generates loans. The originator transfers the 
loans to a special purpose entity (SPE) becoming a sponsor of the SPE. The role of the SPE is to 
manage the loan pool and issue ABSs that give investors the right to receive the cash flows 
originated from the underlying loans. When the SPE issues ABSs, it divides them into different 
tranches (senior, mezzanine and junior) which have different returns and levels of risk, as 
reflected by ratings received by rating agencies. Finally, the amounts paid by the investors for the 
ABSs are transferred to the originator/sponsor which replaces the illiquid loans previously held in 
the balance sheet with cash. 
 
 
 
              Figure 3.1 The securitization process 
 
 
This long chain, linking borrowers with investors, is a mix of on balance and off-balance sheet 
conduits that generate, at every additional link in the chain, an increase in the scope of 
information gaps (Chen et al., 2008). These information asymmetries combined with the 
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favorable accounting treatment prescribed by SFAS 140 offered the opportunity to hide the risks 
generated and to bet on them. 
Under SFAS 140, almost all securitizations were accounted for as a sale with the consequence 
that loans were derecognized from the balance sheet of the originator. Two are the most critical 
issues about the accounting for securitization: a) derecognition; and b) consolidation. SFAS 140 
using a “financial component approach”1 allows to decompose assets into a variety of 
components whose accounting treatment depends on whether the transferor has surrendered 
control or not. Moreover, to eliminate definitively assets from balance sheet, the transferor has 
also to avoid the consolidation of SPEs (special purpose entities). Under SFAS 140 a QSPE 
(qualified special purpose entity) was “automatically” excluded from consolidation and the 
accounting standard required that a qualifying SPE has to be demonstrably distinct from the 
transferor and significantly limited in its activities. Understanding whether a SPE is a QSPE 
required judgment and involved discretionality typically used to avoid the consolidation of the 
vehicle.  
A central point surrounding securitizations is that these transactions might have reduced the 
incentives of financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers. For a lender to screen and 
monitor it must be given appropriate incentives and this can be provided by the illiquid loans on 
its balance sheet (Holmström and Tirole 1997; Diamond and Rajan 2009). When, thanks to 
securitization, banks replace illiquid loans with cash they might lose the appropriate level of 
incentives to properly monitor the quality of loans granted. In this line, Keys et al. (2010) 
investigate the relationship between securitization and screening standards in the context of 
subprime mortgage loans and find that existing securitization practices did adversely affect the 
screening incentives of subprime lenders. 
                                                 
1 SFAS 140, issued in 2000, introduced the financial component approach for the asset derecognition problem. 
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By eliminating loans from the balance sheet, securitization transactions also provide the 
originator with the benefit of reducing risk based capital (Jones, 2000; Acharya and Richardson, 
2009). The critical point is that even when the bank’s originator buys back the most junior 
tranches of ABSs, loans are eliminated from banks’ balance sheet. Nonetheless, because of this 
explicit guarantee that represents an important credit enhancement mechanism, the originator still 
continues to bear the risks arising from the loans. Consistent with the view that securitizations do 
not lead to a shift of the risks of the underlying loans, Barth et al. (2012) show that the bond 
market perceive firm’s credit risk as associated with both the retained and the non-retained 
portion of securitized assets. Moreover, Landsman et al. (2008) show that the stock market treats 
securitized assets and liabilities held by a SPE as belonging to the sponsor-originator. However, 
because of the lack of coordination among accounting standards, regulatory capital requirements 
and tax law, an originator can increase the income and the level of risk without increasing the 
required TIER 1. 
Finally as the interest rate of the pool of loans increases, the earnings arising from a securitization 
increase too. Therefore the more the subprime loans securitized the greater the earnings realized, 
but because of the implicit and explicit guarantee provided by the originator bank, the earnings 
are deeply rooted into risks2. Additionally, securitizations with further involvement, as in the 
presence of retained interest, do not trigger a taxable sale event, thus generating a greater positive 
impact on income. 
Because banks’ risk profile is likely to be affected by CEO’s equity compensation and most 
securitization transactions appear to be deeply rooted into risk, we analyze whether highly 
incentivized CEOs’ used securitizations to reduce the perceived risk while betting on it. The idea 
                                                 
2 Sidel et al. (2008) reported in the Wall Street Journal that Citigroup decide to provide emergency support for seven of its SPEs. 
As a consequence of this decision, Citigroup brought $49 billion of SPEs assets and related liabilities onto its balance sheet. 
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that compensation programs are one of the determinants of the misalignment of incentives and 
conflicts of interest that permeate the “securitization chain” has also been confirmed by the Bank 
for International Settlements (2011), thus making the research question even more intriguing and 
timely.  
 
3.3 Testable Predictions 
We develop our predictions distinguishing among two separate but complementary aspects of 
CEO’s stock and option compensation: equity and risk incentives. Equity incentives are defined 
as the variation in executive’s wealth caused by a change in stock price and therefore measure 
the strength of CEO’s incentives to increase the value of firm’s stock. Risk incentives, instead, 
are defined as the variation in executive’s wealth caused by a change in stock price volatility and 
therefore measure the strength of CEO’s incentives to increase firm’s risk profile (Core et al., 
2003). 
 
Equity incentives and securitization activity 
When securitization transactions qualify for sale accounting, as almost all securitizations did 
under SFAS 140, they offer several benefits that make them particularly appealing to the 
originator. First, securitization enables banks to optimally choose their exposure to the credit risk 
of loans generated (Jiangli and Pritsker 2008). In fact, through securitization activities banks can 
decide which loans to fund on balance sheet and which to sell outside. Second, securitization 
enables banks to replace illiquid loans with cash, thus improving banks’ liquidity and multiplying 
banks’ resources available for being invested in the lending activity. Furthermore, as previously 
discussed, if the financial institution is subject to regulatory capital requirements, securitization 
transactions under US GAAP allow to increase regulatory capital ratios and free up regulatory 
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capital. Third, securitization allows banks which are efficient in originating certain asset types, 
for instance credit card receivables, to improve market share without creating balance sheet 
concentration (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). Fourth, if an originator is able to 
achieve off-balance sheet accounting treatment, the removal of balance sheet assets improves 
certain financial ratios, such as the leverage capital ratio or return on assets. In addition, sales 
treatment could increase non-interest income, which combined with the capital requirements, 
improve the originator’s return on equity (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). Fifth, 
securitization allows banks to increase their profitability through “gains on sale”. In fact, under 
SFAS 140 banks could record a gain equal to the difference between the allocated book value of 
sold components and net proceeds from securitization. Moreover, as the interest rate of the pool 
of loans increases, the earnings arising from a securitization increase too. Thus, the more the 
subprime loans securitized the more the earnings realized. In fact subprime-mortgage-related 
positions, even the most junior, generally have experienced good investment performance as long 
as home prices appreciate and debt markets are sufficiently liquid (Ryan, 2008). Nonetheless, 
because of the implicit and explicit guarantee provided by the originator, the earnings are deeply 
rooted into risks.  
In a nutshell, securitizations under US GAAP had the potential of greatly improving banks’ 
shareholder value: simply put, securitization gives the bank more options for funding its activities 
and managing its risk profile and, all else equal, expanded opportunities should increase bank’s 
value (Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Moreover, the profit opportunities offered by subprime 
securitizations have led experts in the industry to define these financial transactions as “a 
machine that just manufactures earnings out of thin air” (Browning, 2007). Given securitization’s 
potentiality for boosting shareholder value, we conjecture that CEOs whose wealth is more 
tightly linked to firm’s stock price have greater incentives to engage in securitization of risky and 
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non risky loans  than CEOs with low equity incentives, in order to maximize the value of their 
equity holding. As a consequence, we posit the following research hypothesis: 
 
H1: Equity incentives positively affect the securitization of risky and non risky loans  
 
Risk incentives and subprime securitization activity 
CEO’s equity compensation can also influence the riskiness of the securitization transactions 
undertaken.  
Suppose, for instance, that the bank can invest either in a subprime loan pool or in a prime loan 
pool, both with a duration of 10 years. If the bank chooses the subprime loans there is an  
percent chance that the investment will create a wealth of W0 in the next ten years and a (1-) 
percent chance that the investment will create a wealth of W2 in the same time period. 
Alternatively, the bank can grant the prime loans that create a wealth of W1 with  =100, being 
W2 >> W1 > W0. Since shareholders are well diversified they would prefer the risky scenario and 
betting on the possibility of increasing bank’s wealth to W2. In fact, as holders of a call option on 
the firm which can be exercised at any time when firm’s equity exceed the value of debt (Merton, 
1974), shareholders benefit entirely for the upside with limited losses on the downside. Thus, in 
companies with limited liability shareholders have a strong incentive to increase the riskiness of 
the investments. In order to induce CEOs to choose the risky scenario, shareholders can give 
CEOs option grants thus increasing their wealth sensitivity to changes in stock volatility. In this 
line, Coles et al. (2006) document that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility leads 
executives to implement riskier policy. Nonetheless, as stock and option-based compensation 
increases the executive’s personal portfolio becomes less diversified and the executive becomes 
more risk averse and more likely to pursue strategies aimed at mitigating the risk of the 
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institution (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Moreover high levels of perceived risks can negatively affect 
a manager’s tenure and job security (Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Carlson and Bathala, 1997) and can 
harm her reputational and human capital. As a consequence, it could be possible that, even if 
CEOs are provided with risk incentives, they prefer the low risk scenario that ensures W1 instead 
of betting on risky lending activities that could deliver W2 but also W0.  
The use of securitization allows to deeply change the timing of the pay-off for the undiversified 
executive in the presence of high risk incentives. In fact, the executive can choose to invest in the 
subprime loan pool and securitize it. In this scenario the bank immediately records the gains and 
revenues and get W2 while the negative outcome W0 remains delayed over time until the bank has 
to eventually record the loss on the retained interest. As a consequence, the securitization makes 
the risky scenario much more appealing to undiversified executives that are incentivized on risk. 
In fact, by changing the timing of the payoff, the securitization allows undiversified but risk 
incentivized CEOs to bet on risky scenarios while delaying any negative outcome related to them 
that might negatively affect their tenure, job security and human capital. This argument is 
consistent with results in Grant et al. (2009) showing that risk-averse managers incentivized to 
take risks smooth income with the goal to reduce the perceived risk and create accounting 
reserves to cover potential losses.  Therefore we expect a positive relationship between CEO’s 
risk incentives and the securitization of risky loans. 
Thus we posit the following prediction: 
 
H2: Risk incentives positively affect the securitization of risky loans  
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3.4 Data 
Sample Selection 
For the purpose of our analysis we identify all financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000-
6300) available on Execucomp dataset in fiscal year 2003 and we keep all observations with an 
identifiable CEO throughout 2003-2009. In order to mitigate any possible survivorship bias, we 
augment our sample including financial institutions that have been delisted during the financial 
crisis but that have at least five years of data starting fiscal year 2003, thus assuring that we have 
information on these institutions at least until 2007 when the crisis has started. For our sample 
banks, we hand collect data on securitization activities from 10-K filings using disclosure under 
SFAS 140; we retrieve control variables from Compustat, Compustat Bank and CRSP; and we 
collect compensation data from Execucomp dataset and 10-K filings. We ended up with a final 
sample of 526 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2009 generated by 81 unique 
financial institutions. Table 3.1 describes the sample selection process and the distribution of 
observations over time. Out of 526 firm-year observations, about the 40% reports securitization 
transactions thus confirming that the use of securitization practices has been a concentrated 
phenomenon in the financial industry.  
 
Variable Measurement 
Securitization  
We hand collect data on banks’ securitization activities from 10-K filings. Specifically, we use 
disclosure under SFAS 140 that requires institutions to provide information on securitized 
financial assets3. In order to rule out the possibility that our analysis is driven by a size effect, we 
                                                 
3 Two caveats apply. First, banks do not report data on non material securitizations and we consider these amounts equal to zero. 
On the contrary if the bank reports evidence of securitizations but the disclosure provided in the 10-K filing does not allow to 
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scale loans securitized by the amount of total loans managed by the bank (sum of total securitized 
and withheld loans) and create the variable Securitization. For financial institutions engaging in 
securitization transactions we also retrieve the amount of credit losses on securitized loans and 
we create a variable (Loss Secur) that computes the percentage of credit loss on securitized loans. 
We interpret this variable as a proxy of the riskiness of securitization transactions undertaken by 
the bank. Given that most losses on securitized assets have been recorded during the financial 
crisis, it is an essential feature of our research design to collect data until 2009 and not limiting 
the analysis to the pre-crisis period4. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
understand the exact amount of assets securitized the observation is deleted. Second, disclosure under SFAS 140 applies to 
securitization transactions in which the bank has retained interests. Since this is the case for most securitizations the effect on the 
analysis is trivial. 
4 We limit the analysis to 2009 because starting from fiscal year 2010 new accounting standards for securitization apply and this 
would affect the analysis. 
670
128
16
Firm-Year Observations 526
Unique Firms 81
Year # obs
2003 78
2004 76
2005 76
2006 78
2007 79
2008 72
2009 67
Total 526
Firm-year observazions without securitizations 318 60%
Firm-year observazions with securitizations 208 40%
Total 526 100%
TABLE 3.1
Sample Selection and Composition
Financial institutions with missing information on other variables
Financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000-6300) available on 
Execucomp dataset in fiscal year 2003
minus
Financial institutions with missing information on securitization 
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Similarly, we create a proxy of the riskiness of non-securitized loans (Loss Loans) defined as the 
percentage losses on loans withheld on balance sheet. Finally, we define a variable (Diff in 
Losses) that computes the difference between the percentage loss on securitized assets and the 
percentage loss on withheld loans. Thus, higher values of Diff in Losses indicate that executives 
transferred risk embedded in loans to outside investors through securitization.  
 
CEO’s incentives  
As emphasized by Core et al. (2003), executive incentives from stocks and options are properly 
measured only considering portfolio incentives. In fact, the amount of newly granted restricted 
stocks and options is not sufficient for evaluating the amount of incentives the executive is 
provided with (Yermack 1995). We measure CEO’s equity incentives (Equity Incentives) as the 
dollar change in the value of executive’s stock and option holdings that would come from a one 
percentage point increase in the company stock price. The sensitivity of CEO’s stock holding is 
simply computed multiplying the number of shares held by the 1% of the stock price at fiscal 
year-end, while for computing the sensitivity of CEO’s option holding we take the partial 
derivative of the Black-Scholes equation with respect to stock price (option’s Delta) as shown in 
Appendix A. Starting from the fiscal year 2006, Execucomp reports all the information necessary 
for computing the sensitivity of CEO’s equity portfolio to a one percentage point increase in the 
stock price. For observations preceding 2006 we use Core and Guay (2002)’s methodology for 
estimating the delta of executives’ option portfolio. In particular, CEO’s options are divided into 
three groups (options awarded during the year, options awarded in previous years but not yet 
exercisable and options granted in previous years and currently exercisable) and separate 
estimates of the delta are computed. Core and Guay (2002) show that their proxy captures more 
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than 99% of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivity. To reduce the influence of 
extreme values, in regression analyses we use the log transformation of Equity Incentives. 
We measure CEO risk-related incentives (Risk Incentives) in a methodology similar to that used 
by Rogers (2002, 2005) and Grant et al. (2009), namely the Vega of CEO’s stock options divided 
by their Delta. We compute CEO’s option Vega as the sensitivity of CEO’s option holding to a 
unit change in stock price volatility by using the first derivative of the Black-Scholes option-
pricing model in relation to firm’s volatility as described in Appendix A. When necessary we 
used Core and Guay (2002)’s methodology to retrieve the data for computing options’ Vega and 
Delta. Computing CEO’s risk-incentives using the Vega-to-Delta ratio has the advantage of 
reducing multicollinearity problems between the sensitivity of CEO’s equity portfolio to stock 
price and stock volatility that is particularly severe in small samples.  
In the analysis we also control for the age of the CEO (Log Age). Including CEO’s age in the 
analysis allows us to control for potential effects linked to CEO’s career concerns that might 
influence securitization activities. The underlying idea is that career concerns are  higher  for 
young versus old managers since they have to influence market’s beliefs about their ability 
(Holmström, 1999). 
 
Bank’s characteristics 
In an attempt to control for confounding variables that might influence the level of securitization 
observed, we include in the multivariate analysis a set of bank-related characteristics. B_M is the 
equity book-to-market ratio computed as the book value of equity divided by its market value at 
fiscal year-end; Returns is bank’s annual market returns; Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; Change Assets is the percentage change in total assets with respect to the previous year as 
control for potential M&A activities; Change Tier 1 proxies for regulatory capital constraints and 
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it is computed as the percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to the previous year; Interest 
Income is net interest income divided by total revenues as a proxy for bank business model; GDP 
is the gross domestic product that controls for macroeconomics trends that might influence 
securitization activities.  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis while 
Panel B presents Pearson correlation coefficients. Data on Securitization show that, on average, 
financial institutions in our final sample securitize about the 11% of managed loans. The highly 
asymmetric distribution of the variable is driven by a large part of observations taking value of 
zero because of no (or immaterial) securitization activities5. When computed only considering 
banks involved in securitization transactions, untabulated results show that the average value of 
Securitization is 0.27 with banks in the 90th percentile securitizing an amount of loans equal to 
the 64% of the managed portfolio. Our research design aims at exploiting this variability in the 
data in order to analyze if CEO’s incentives can explain part of it.  
As expected, the correlation matrix reported in Panel B shows that old CEOs and CEOs in large 
bank have higher levels of equity incentives than their colleagues that are in the early stage of the 
career or that guide small institutions. The level of equity incentives is also strongly positively 
correlated with bank’s performance and growth opportunities while the relation reverses sign 
when examining risk incentives. On the contrary, large financial institutions provide CEOs not 
only with high levels of equity incentives but also with high risk incentives with respect to small 
banks. 
                                                 
5 We incorporate this feature of the data in our empirical analysis by using Tobit models. 
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N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Securitization 526 0.107 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.108
Diff in Losses 162 0.007 0.023 -0.005 0.000 0.019
Equity Incentives 526 5.786 1.786 4.849 5.947 7.033
Risk Incentives 526 0.905 0.721 0.400 0.783 1.209
Log Age 526 4.031 0.115 3.951 4.043 4.111
B_M 526 0.806 0.881 0.399 0.550 0.822
Returns 526 0.033 0.395 -0.120 0.096 0.238
Size 526 10.175 1.717 8.919 9.905 11.348
Change Assets 526 0.112 0.171 0.014 0.084 0.170
Change Tier 1 526 0.026 0.185 -0.062 0.000 0.078
Interest Income 526 0.427 0.164 0.334 0.434 0.534
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Securitization 1.000
2 Diff in Losses 0.121 1.000
3 Equity Incentives 0.271*** 0.073 1.000
4 Risk Incentives 0.046 0.068 -0.267*** 1.000
5 Log Age -0.185*** -0.195* 0.216*** -0.034 1.000
6 B_M 0.011 0.043 -0.361*** 0.480*** 0.007 1.000
7 Returns 0.011 0.078 0.249*** -0.494*** 0.010 -0.496*** 1.000
8 Size 0.396*** 0.100 0.432*** 0.231*** 0.061 0.018 -0.099* 1.000
9 Change Assets 0.086* 0.071 0.265*** -0.207*** 0.007 -0.223*** 0.198*** 0.060 1.000
10 Change Tier 1 -0.001 -0.015 -0.067 0.120** -0.002 0.110* 0.005 0.024 -0.090* 1.000
11 Interest Income -0.307*** -0.040 -0.286*** -0.021 -0.059 -0.052 0.056 -0.435*** -0.003 0.031
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the main variables
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
TABLE 3.2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the analysis while Panel B reports Pearson correlation coefficients. 
Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. P-values are two tailed.
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3.5 Empirical Analyses 
Our two research hypotheses predict that CEO’s equity incentives determine both the total 
amount of securitizations undertaken by financial institutions and the quality of loans securitized, 
while risk-related incentives only determine the securitization of risky loans.  
To test the effect of equity compensation on banks’ total securitization activities, we first group 
banks into quintiles according to the level of CEO’s equity incentives and report the amount of 
securitization for each group of financial institutions. Table 3.3, Panel A shows that as one moves 
from the first to the fifth quintile of the distribution of CEO’s equity incentives, the amount of 
loans securitized steadily increases, thus providing preliminary support for the role of CEO’s 
equity incentives in boosting securitizations. To better investigate H1 we estimate the following 
Tobit model with year fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at 
firm-level: 
 
Securitizationi,t = 0 + 1Equity Incentivesi,t + 2Risk Incentivesi,t + 3Log Agei,t + 4B_Mi,t + 
5Returnsi,t + 6Sizei,t + 7Change Assetsi,t + 8Change Tier 1i,t + 9Interest 
Incomei,t + 10GDPi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                (1) 
 
where i,t  indicate, respectively, firm and year observations and all the variables have already 
been defined. Our research hypotheses predict a positive and significant α1 and an insignificant 
α2. When estimating (1), it is necessary to use a censored regression model because Securitization 
takes the value of zero for a large part of the sample and it is a continuous random variable over 
strictly positive values. As a consequence a linear model would not work properly (Wooldridge, 
2002). 
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The results from equation (1), reported in columns 1 in Panel B of Table 3.3, strongly support H1 
documenting a positive and significant relation between securitization and CEO’s equity 
incentives; while no relation is detected between securitization and CEO’s risk incentives. Given 
the variability in the distribution of the dependent variable, it could be argued that results might 
be partially driven by some extreme observations. In order to address this concern we divide our 
sample in three groups and mark them with an ordering variable taking the value of: 
 
 1 if the bank does not engage into securitizations; 
 2 if the bank engages into securitizations and Securitization is below the sample median 
of securitizing institutions; 
 3 if the bank engages into securitizations and Securitization is above the sample median 
of securitizing institutions. 
 
We then fit equation (1) using an ordered probit model and present results in columns 2 of Table 
3.3, Panel B. The advantage of using this approach is that results cannot be driven by few 
outliers; nonetheless the use of an ordering variable reduces information available in the data. 
Column 3, instead, fits model (1) excluding observations in years 2008 and 2009. This additional 
analysis takes into consideration the fact that the securitization market greatly reduced after 2007, 
because of the advent of the financial crisis. Also these alternative model specifications provide 
strong support for H1, suggesting that CEOs with high equity incentives have engaged in 
securitization transactions to a larger extent than CEOs whose wealth was less tightly linked to 
shareholder value. 
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Panel A
Securitization
Equity Incentives Quintile Mean (N=526)
Lowest 0.032
2nd quintile 0.070
3rd quintile 0.083
4th quintile 0.140
Highest 0.212
H0: Lowest - Highest = 0 t = - 7.038 p-value = 0.000
Panel B
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 0.072*** 0.217*** 0.095***
[0.026] [0.083] [0.032]
Risk Incentives 0.026 0.069 0.017
[0.044] [0.142] [0.060]
Log Age -1.081*** -3.090*** -1.078***
[0.366] [1.036] [0.391]
B_M 0.081** 0.268** 0.235*
[0.033] [0.118] [0.127]
Returns 0.030 0.089 0.002
[0.045] [0.153] [0.106]
Size 0.098*** 0.412*** 0.079***
[0.024] [0.077] [0.029]
Change Assets 0.019 0.015 0.032
[0.118] [0.410] [0.122]
Change Tier 1 0.043 0.136 0.008
[0.076] [0.257] [0.104]
Interest Income -0.355 -0.886 -0.339
[0.226] [0.828] [0.255]
GDP -0.076 -0.096 -0.145
[0.151] [0.448] [0.088]
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 526 526 387
(Pseudo) R2 40.6% 25.7% 40.7%
(3)
Panel A tabulates the amount of securitization according to the quintile of the distribution of
CEO’s equity incentives. Panel B reports estimate results from model (1). 
Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%
level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are
reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 3.3
(1)
Tobit
Securitization
(2)
Ordered Probit
Securitization
Continuous variable Three Groups
CEO Incentives and Securitization
Securitization 
Until 2007
Tobit 
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Results from Table 3.3 also show that banks with higher book-to-market ratios engage more in 
securitizations than financial institutions with lower book-to-market ratios. A possible 
explanation is that these banks have higher incentives to securitize loans because they have lower 
growth opportunities and thus more difficulties in collecting funds. Data also show that old CEOs 
undertake less securitizations than their young colleagues, and this is consistent with young 
managers having higher career concerns and thus trying to boost shareholder value through 
securitizations to a larger extent.  
A possible concern that might arise when estimating equation (1) relates to the fact that CEO’s 
equity and risk incentives can be endogenous with respect to banks’ decision of engaging into 
securitizations. This is the case if exogenous shocks to the regression residuals affect both CEO’s 
compensation structure and securitization strategies. Moreover model (1) might be affected by a 
reverse causality bias. To address this problem we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. It 
is well known that the challenge faced by researchers when dealing with IV models is to identify 
valid and strong instruments. These are variables that are strongly correlated with the endogenous 
variable under investigation but that are not correlated with the error term in the second stage 
equation6. In order to identify such an instrument we exploit a change in US GAAP that took 
place in 2000. Here it is important to note that i) the securitization business model and ii) the 
subprime securitization market, developed thanks to the possibility offered by SFAS 140 to retain 
interests in securitized assets as credit enhancement mechanism and applying sale accounting to 
the transferred assets. This was possible thanks to the Financial Components Concept included in 
SFAS 140. Without this concept most securitizations would have to be accounted for as secured 
borrowing. The Financial Components Concept has been introduced in 2000 by SFAS 140 while 
the prior SFAS 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
                                                 
6 See Larcker and Rusticus (2010) for a useful discussion of the use of instrumental variables in research 
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Extinguishment of Liabilities (1996) did not contain this provision. As a consequence, the recent 
securitization and subprime business model investigated in the paper has emerged after this 
change in accounting standards. Data reported in Table 3.4 document that after the discussed 
change in accounting standards in 2000, the securitization market sharply increased, specifically 
the subprime securitization market was almost non-existing beforehand. Thus, we use as 
instrument for CEO’s equity and risk incentives during the period 2003-2009 the level of equity 
and risk incentives that the same CEO had before 20007. The level of incentives held by the CEO 
in the same bank (or in the other banks/firms in which she has served) before 2000 is likely to be 
correlated with her future level of incentives but cannot be correlated with a securitization 
business model that did not exist8. 
 
 
Table 3.5 presents results from estimating model (1) using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach.  The high R2 reported in the first stage suggest that variables included in the model are 
good predictors of the endogenous variables.  
                                                 
7 Due to data limitation we have considered compensation data back to 1992. 
8 Even if data reported in Table 3.4 corroborate the assumption that the securitization business model that has generated the 
financial crisis (and that is under investigation in this paper) came to existence only after the introduction of SFAS 140, we cannot 
ignore the fact that securitization transactions were also present before 2000. As a consequence we acknowledge that our 
instruments are likely to be semi-endogenous and not perfectly exogenous (Larcker and Rusticus 2010).  
Dollars in Billions
Year Prime MBS Subprime MBS Total MBS Average 1997-1999 Prime MBS
Average 1997-1999 
Subprime  MBS
Average 1997-1999 
Total MBS
1997 423                66                    489              687                         70                            756                          
1998 860                83                    943              
1999 777                60                    837              
2001 1,246             98                    1,345           
2002 1,641             176                  1,817           
2003 2,393             269                  2,662           1,496                      444                          1,940                       
2004 1,306             521                  1,827           
2005 1,314             797                  2,112           
2006 1,202             814                  2,016           118% 539% 157%
2007 1,372             433                  1,804           
Data have been retrieved from Inside Mortgage Finance Publication. MBS is the acronym of Mortgage-Backed Securities
% Increase w.r.t. pre 2000
TABLE 3.4
Securitization of Home Mortgages pre and post 2000
Average 2001-2007 
Prime MBS
Average 2001-2007 
Subprime  MBS
Average 2001-2007 
Total MBS
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Dependent Variable: Securitization 
Until 2007
Tobit IV
Equity Incentives Prior 2000 0.639*** -0.032
[0.062] [0.026]
Risk Incentives Prior 2000 0.737*** 0.563***
[0.268] [0.114]
Equity Incentives 0.156** 0.606*** 0.163**
[0.062] [0.229] [0.072]
Risk Incentives 0.222 0.540 0.191
[0.316] [0.930] [0.322]
Log Age -1.329*** -4.317*** -1.329*** 1.988*** -0.022
[0.412] [1.217] [0.508] [0.477] [0.203]
B_M 0.087* 0.355** 0.209 -0.377*** 0.156***
[0.046] [0.166] [0.252] [0.079] [0.034]
Returns 0.060 0.040 0.304* 0.511*** -0.418***
[0.122] [0.375] [0.159] [0.189] [0.081]
Size 0.040 0.205 0.029 0.318*** 0.104***
[0.055] [0.171] [0.058] [0.036] [0.015]
Change Assets -0.045 -0.367 -0.023 1.388*** -0.360**
[0.164] [0.534] [0.204] [0.334] [0.142]
Change Tier 1 0.027 0.070 -0.095 0.337 0.002
[0.074] [0.252] [0.107] [0.313] [0.133]
Interest Income -0.337 -0.644 -0.344 -0.885** 0.347**
[0.273] [0.914] [0.329] [0.378] [0.161]
GDP -0.299 -0.854 -0.004 -0.165** 0.151***
[0.294] [0.845] [0.041] [0.077] [0.033]
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 526 526 387 526 526
(Pseudo) R2 39.8% 26.3% 37.5% 54.3% 49.3%
TABLE 3.5
CEO Incentives and Securitization with Endogeneity
Equity Incentives Risk IncentivesThree Groups
The table reports the first and second stage estimates from model (1) using a 2SLS approach. We use as instrument for CEO’s equity incentives
the level of equity incentives the same CEO had before 2000 (Equity Incentives Prior 2000) and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the level
of risk incentives the same CEO had before 2000 (Risk Incentives Prior 2000). Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values
are two tailed.
(4) (5)
Second Stage First Stage
Securitization
Continuous variable
Tobit IV
Securitization
(1) (2) (3)
Ordered Logit IV
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Estimate results from the second stage strongly corroborate findings reported in Table 3.3 and 
thus confirm the support to H1.  
We now move the focus of the analysis from banks’ overall securitization activity to the quality 
of loans securitized and banks’ decision to transfer risks to outside investors through 
securitization.  
Table 3.6 provides univariate support for our hypothesis that CEO’s equity and risk incentives 
motivate executives to securitize low-quality assets and transfer risk to outside investors through 
securitization. Specifically, we divide the sample into four groups according to the median value 
of CEO’s equity and risk incentives (High vs Low)9. Table 3.6, Panel A tabulates the mean values 
of the percentage loss on securitized loans (Loss Secur) for each level of CEO’s incentives while 
Panel B tabulates the difference between the percentage loss on securitized loans and withheld 
loans (Diff in Losses). We interpret the first metric as a proxy of the riskiness of loans securitized 
because risky securitized loans are more likely to suffer credit losses. The second metric, instead, 
investigates the opportunistic behavior of CEOs when engaging into securitizations, because it 
compares the losses recorded on loans transferred off-balance with losses on loans withheld in the 
balance sheet. Data from Table 3.6, Panel A indicate that financial institutions in which the CEO 
had high equity and risk incentives (group High/High) engaged in risky securitization 
transactions to a larger extent than banks in which the CEO had low incentives (group Low/Low). 
Similarly, Panel B shows that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives are more likely to 
transfer risk to outside investors than CEOs with low incentives as documented by the 
significantly higher value of Diff in Losses in the group High/High w.r.t. the group Low/Low.  
 
                                                 
9 The sample size is 162 because we have to restrict the analysis to those observations with available data on losses on securitized 
loans. 
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In order to better disentangle the effect of CEO’s equity and risk incentives on the quality of 
loans transferred off-balance through securitization we estimate the following model through 
2SLS: 
 
Loss Secur (Diff in Losses)i,t = β0 + β 1Equity Incentivesi,t + β2Risk Incentivesi,t + β3Log Agei,t + 
β4B_Mi,t + β5Returnsi,t + β6Sizei,t + β7Change Assetsi,t + β8Change 
Tier 1i,t + β9Interest Incomei,t + β10GDPi,t + β11Loss Loansi,t + εi,t                                    
(2) 
Panel A
N= 162
High Low
High 0.031 0.017
Low 0.017 0.009
H0: (High/High) = (Low/Low) t = 3.301 p-value= 0.002
Panel B
N= 162
High Low
High 0.017 0.006
Low 0.003 0.003
H0: (High/High) = (Low/Low) t = 2.402 p-value= 0.020
The table has been created by classifying observations with available data on
losses on securitized loans (N=162) into four groups (High/High, High/Low,
Low/High, Low/Low) according to the median value of CEO’s equity and risk
incentives. Panel A reports, for each group, the mean value of the percentage loss
on securitized loans (Loss Secur ) while Panel B reports the mean value of the
difference between the percentage loss on securitized loans and withheld loans
(Diff  in Losses) . Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 3.6
CEO Incentives and Losses on Securitization
Equity Incentives
Risk Incentives
Diff in Losses
Mean
Loss Secur
Mean
Risk Incentives
Equity Incentives
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Estimate results using Loss Secur as dependent variable are reported in Table 3.7, Columns 1 
while Columns 2 reports results from using Diff in Losses as dependent variable. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 0.008** 0.007**
[0.004] [0.003]
Risk Incentives 0.025** 0.025**
[0.011] [0.011]
Log Age -0.064*** -0.060***
[0.022] [0.020]
B_M -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Returns 0.001 0.002
[0.007] [0.007]
Size -0.002 -0.002
[0.004] [0.004]
Change Assets 0.014 0.018
[0.014] [0.013]
Change Tier 1 0.019 0.019
[0.011] [0.011]
Interest Income 0.003 0.008
[0.020] [0.019]
GDP -0.010** -0.012**
[0.005] [0.004]
Loss Loans 0.812***
[0.202]
Year Dummies YES YES
Observations 162 162
R2 43.6% 19.0%
The table reports second-stage estimate results from model (2) estimated
through 2SLS. In the untabulated first-stage we use as instrument for
CEO’s equity incentives the level of equity incentives the same CEO had
before 2000 and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the level of risk
incentives the same CEO had before 2000. Variable definition in Appendix
3.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm-
level are reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 3.7
CEO Incentives and Risky Securitization
(1) (2)
Loss Secur Diff in Losses
2SLS 2SLS
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The coefficients on Equity Incentives and Risk Incentives in the first column of the table indicate 
that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives tended to securitize risky loans that are more 
likely to record credit losses. Moreover, results from the second column provide evidence that 
equity and risk incentives motivated CEOs to transfer the riskiest loans to outside investors while 
keeping on balance sheet the safest ones. These results are consistent with both H1 and H2 
claiming that CEOs incentivized on equity and risk were motivated to engage in risky lending 
activities and to use securitization as an accounting tool for hiding the risk generated from the 
balance sheet. Thus, the analysis provides evidence that CEO’s equity and risk incentives 
motivated executives to opportunistically clean their balance sheets from undesired risks through 
securitization. Ex post, it is possible to affirm that securitization practices were effective in hiding 
the risks undertaken by CEOs, since neither banks’ investors nor analysts were able to understand 
the risks embedded in securitization transactions and in the underlying lending activity. 
Results from the previous analyses suggest that CEO’s equity incentives are both a determinant 
of banks’ overall securitization activities and the riskiness of securitized loans, while CEO’s risk 
incentives only determine the risk profile of securitization. We further investigate this point by 
retrieving data on financial institutions most involved in the securitization of subprime loans. 
Subprime loans are made to those who have impaired credit and their securitization is the riskiest 
form of securitization transactions undertaken by financial institutions. Typically, subprime 
borrowers have low credit ratings and a reasonable chance of defaulting on the debt repayment: 
as a consequence, financial institutions charge significantly higher rates on subprime loans than 
prime mortgages. This allowed banks to increase their profits from the lending activity and also 
provided banks with high incentives to include these loans in securitization transactions in order 
to transfer the associated high risk to outside investors. We retrieve data on the top subprime 
securitizers from the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual edited by Inside Mortgage Finance 
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Publications. We have data on top subprime securitizers for the period 2000-2007. Even if the 
Mortgage Market Statistical Annual only reports data for the top financial institutions involved in 
subprime securitizations, it has a very wide coverage of the securitization market with top 
subprime securitizers disclosed in the dataset covering more than the 80% of overall subprime 
market. We define a dummy variable (Top Subprime) taking the value of 1 if the financial 
institution is listed in the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual as top subprime securitizer at least 
once during the period analyzed, zero otherwise. Table 3.8, Panel A compares the percentage of 
top subprime observations according to the level of CEO’s equity and risk incentives. Two-
sample tests of proportion indicates that, in the presence of high CEO’s equity and risk incentives 
the percentage of top subprime securitizers is significantly higher than in the presence of low 
CEO’s incentives.   
 
 
Panel A
High Low
High 46% 38%
Low 16% 0%
H0: (High/High) = (Low/Low) z = 5.550 p-value <  0.000
The table has been created by classifying observations into four
groups (High/High, High/Low, Low/High, Low/Low) according to
the median value of CEO’s equity and risk incentives. A financial
institution is classified as top subprime securitizer if it is disclosed as
such in the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual edited by Inside 
Mortgage Finance Publications . Variable definition in Appendix
3.B. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 3.8
CEO Incentives and Subprime Securitization
% Top Subprime
Risk Incentives
Equity Incentives
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To investigate in a multivariate setting if CEO’s equity and risk incentives increase banks’ 
probability of being a securitizer of subprime loans we estimate model (1) through 2SLS using as 
dependent variable the dummy Top Subprime above defined: 
 
Top Subprimei,t = γ0 + γ1 Equity Incentivesi,t + γ2 Risk Incentivesi,t +  γ3 Log Agei,t + γ4 B_Mi,t + γ5 
Returnsi,t + γ6 Sizei,t + γ7 Change Assetsi,t + γ8 Change Tier 1i,t+ γ9 Interest 
Incomei,t+ γ10 GDPi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                            (3) 
 
Estimate results are reported in Table 3.8, Panel B. Column 1 presents results for the full sample, 
column 2 restricts the sample to 2007, column 3 uses the full time period but tabulate results 
using only securitizing banks, and the last column uses securitizing financial institutions only and 
restricts the sample to 2007. Results on CEO’s equity and risk incentives corroborate findings 
from panel A and suggest that CEOs with high equity and risk incentives are more likely to 
engage in the securitization of subprime loans than executives with low incentives. Therefore 
results support both H1 and H2 pointing out to the pivotal role of CEO’s equity and risk 
incentives in boosting risky securitizations.  
In order to further investigate the opportunistic behavior of highly incentivized CEOs when 
engaging into securitizations, we analyze bank’s disclosure about the amount of losses recorded 
by loans that have been transferred off-balance. SFAS 140 explicitly requires an entity that 
securitizes financial assets to disclose information about the quality of securitized assets, 
including the amount of credit losses10. Specifically we investigate if CEOs with high equity and 
risk incentives not only engaged in risky securitization transactions but also hid the quality of 
loans securitized by providing external investors with less information about the riskiness of 
securitizations undertaken. 
                                                 
10 Also in this case the requirement applies to securitizations with retained interests. 
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Panel B
Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 1.065*** 0.936*** 0.915*** 0.911**
[0.361] [0.331] [0.298] [0.387]
Risk Incentives 3.797*** 3.535** 2.708** 3.460*
[1.471] [1.714] [1.284] [1.845]
Log Age -1.908 0.114 -0.643 0.216
[2.550] [2.149] [2.201] [2.825]
B_M -0.051 1.868*** -0.102* 2.590**
[0.052] [0.715] [0.060] [1.143]
Returns 1.109* 1.840** 0.794 3.048**
[0.640] [0.872] [0.695] [1.232]
Size 0.271 0.602*** 0.467** 0.487**
[0.243] [0.205] [0.221] [0.205]
Change Assets 0.099 0.848 0.835 0.071
[0.812] [0.937] [0.912] [1.183]
Change Tier 1 0.470 -0.569 1.383* 0.330
[0.607] [0.554] [0.715] [0.850]
Interest Income -0.247 -0.620 0.644 -0.761
[1.566] [1.535] [1.724] [1.688]
GDP -4.474*** -2.838** -4.855*** -1.925*
[1.305] [1.355] [1.621] [1.096]
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 526 387 208 163
Pseudo R2 61.8% 68.4% 50.1% 58.6%
The table reports second-stage estimate results from probit model (3) estimated through 2SLS.
In the untabulated first-stage we use as instrument for CEO’s equity incentives the level of equity
incentives the same CEO had before 2000 and as instrument for CEO’s risk incentives the level
of risk incentives the same CEO had before 2000. Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. *,**,***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed.
TABLE 3.8
Subprime Securitization
Top Subprime Top Subprime Top SubprimeTop Subprime
(1)
Full Sample Full Sample Until 2007
2SLS
Only 
Securitizers
(3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS
(2)
2SLS
Only 
Securitizers 
Until 2007
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For doing so we analyze the disclosure provided by financial institutions in their financial 
statements and score the quality of information on losses recorded on securitized loans on a 4-
points scale as follows (Disclosure Index): 
 
- 4 points if the amount of losses on securitized assets is disclosed in a table and the 
information is provided for each type of securitized asset (e.g. mortgages, credit cards 
etc…); 
- 3 points if the amount of losses on securitized assets is disclosed in a table but the 
information is only provided at an aggregate level; 
- 2 points if the amount of losses on securitized assets is not disclosed in a table and it has 
to be indirectly retrieved from information provided in the financial statements; 
- 1 point if it is not possible to understand the amount of losses on securitized assets. 
 
The median value of the Disclosure Index is 2.21 with a standard deviation of 1.06. In order to 
investigate the role of CEOs equity and risk incentives on the quality of information provided to 
investors, we estimate the following ordered probit model through 2SLS: 
 
Disclosure Indexi,t = δ0 + δ1Equity Incentivesi,t + δ2Risk Incentivesi,t + δ3Log Agei,t + δ4B_Mi,t + 
δ5Returnsi,t + δ6Sizei,t +  δ7Change Assetsi,t  + δ8Change Tier 1i,t + δ9Interest 
Incomei,t + δ10GDPi,t + εi,t                                                                                                                   
                                (4)                          
 
Estimate results are reported in Table 3.9.  
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Dependent Variable:
Equity Incentives 0.134
[0.105]
Risk Incentives -1.857**
[0.731]
Log Age -0.608
[1.553]
B_M 0.216*
[0.128]
Returns -0.593
[0.584]
Size 0.324**
[0.143]
Change Assets -2.897***
[0.746]
Change Tier 1 -0.925
[0.634]
Interest Income -0.335
[1.431]
GDP 4.349***
[1.638]
Year Dummies YES
Observations 208
Pseudo R2 8.2%
Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at firm-level are reported in brackets. P-values
are two tailed.
TABLE 3.9
CEO Incentives and Disclosure
Disclosure Index
2SLS
The table reports second-stage estimate results from the
ordered probit model (4), estimated through 2SLS. In
the untabulated first-stage we use as instrument for
CEO’s equity incentives the level of equity incentives
the same CEO had before 2000 and as instrument for
CEO’s risk incentives the level of risk incentives the
same CEO had before 2000.
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The coefficient on CEO’s risk incentives is negative and significant indicating that CEOs with 
high risk incentives not only securitized risky loans to a larger extent than CEOs with lower 
incentives, but they also provided external investors with lower information about the quality of 
loans securitized. On the contrary, we do not find the same effect when examining CEO’s equity 
incentives. This last result nicely fits with findings from Table 3.5 suggesting that CEO’s equity 
incentives, contrary to risk incentives, determine overall securitization activity and not only the 
securitization of risky loans. Results reported in Table 3.9 further confirm the opportunistic 
behavior of CEOs when they engage into securitization transaction, motivated by the structure of 
their incentive scheme.  
Finally, we test if banks involved in the subprime securitization indeed over performed other 
financial institutions before the crash of the subprime market in 2007 and if this relation changed 
once the subprime crisis has blew up. To shed light on this issue, we analyze how stock returns 
and earnings per share of top subprime securitizers changed before and after 2007, with respect to 
other financial institution. Specifically, we fit the following OLS model in which the variable 
Crisis is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in years 2007-2009, zero otherwise, and Performance 
is either annual market returns or earnings per share (EPS). 
 
Performancei,t = λ0 + λ1Crisisi,t + λ2Top Subprimei,t + λ3Crisis*Top Subprimei,t + λ4B_Mi,t + 
λ5Sizei,t + λ6Change Assetsi,t + λ7Change Tier 1i,t + λ8Interest Incomei,t + 
λ9Securitizationi,t + εi,t   
(5) 
 
Estimate results are reported in Table 3.10, Columns 1 and 2.  
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The positive and significant coefficient on Top Subprime indicates that subprime securitizers, 
before 2007, have performed much better than the other financial institutions. The negative 
coefficient on the dummy marking years 2007-2009 confirms the strong reduction in market 
returns and earnings recorded by all financial institutions with the advent of the credit crisis. 
Crisis -0.176*** -0.966*** 0.041
[0.023] [0.337] [0.043]
Top Subprime 0.107*** 2.068*** 0.341*
[0.036] [0.526] [0.178]
Top Subprime * Crisis -0.158* -2.801** 0.189
[0.080] [1.331] [0.141]
B_M -0.192*** -1.428*** -0.127***
[0.026] [0.335] [0.035]
Size -0.030** 0.087 0.186***
[0.013] [0.116] [0.038]
Change Assets 0.124 1.633* -0.582***
[0.079] [0.828] [0.141]
Change Tier 1 0.219*** 1.038 0.017
[0.082] [0.669] [0.098]
Interest Income 0.029 0.156 0.689***
[0.129] [0.955] [0.233]
Securitization 0.071 0.462 -0.310
[0.063] [0.908] [0.234]
Observations 526 526 526
R2 34.8% 39.8% 39.3%
The table reports OLS estimate results from model (5). Market returns are monthly returns
cumulated over the year; EPS is earnings per share, Dividends is dividends per share; Crisis
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 in years 2007-2009, zero otherwise; 
Variable definition in Appendix 3.B. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%,
1% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm-level are
reported in brackets. P-values are two tailed.
Dividends
(3)
TABLE 3.10
Securitization and Performance
(1) (2)
EPSMarket Returns
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Interestingly the interaction term between Top Subprime and the crisis dummy is negative and 
significant, thus suggesting that the decrease in performance after 2007 has been more severe for 
banks that had engaged in the securitization of non-agency loans. These results further 
corroborates the role of subprime securitization in boosting stock prices and earnings before the 
advent of the subprime mortgage crisis and in deteriorating performance once the market has 
crashed.  Finally, Table 3.10, Column 3 analyzes dividend distribution. This analysis is 
particularly interesting since dividend polices represent the core of the shareholder-bondholder 
conflict, which is exacerbated in the presence of incentives that align executives’ interests with 
those of shareholders. Results indicate that subprime securitizers distributed more dividends than 
other financial institutions before the beginning of the crisis while they did not reduced dividend 
distribution on the immediately subsequent period. Overall, results presented are in line with the 
idea that the securitization of risky loans has allowed banks and shareholders to pursue their 
private interest while accumulating and hiding risks that ex-post have been paid by the whole 
system. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 In this paper we empirically investigate the role of CEO’s equity and risk-related incentives in 
boosting securitization activities and in transferring risk to outside investor through the 
securitization of risky loans.  
Using a sample of US financial institution over the period 2003-2009, we document that CEOs 
with high equity incentives systematically engaged in securitization transactions to a larger extent 
than CEOs with low equity incentives. We also show that CEO’s with high equity and risk-
related incentives engaged more in risky securitization activities than CEOs with low incentives 
and transferred risk to outside investors by moving off-balance the riskiest loans. Moreover, we 
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show that executives incentivized on risk provided outside investors with a low quality disclosure 
about losses recorded on loans that were securitized thus contributing to increase the opacity of 
transactions undertaken. We interpret these results as evidence that highly incentivized CEOs saw 
securitization as a useful tool to enhance banks’ profits and stock price. Moreover, we argue that 
risk-incentivized executives saw in securitizations an opportunity to hide the risks generated 
while betting on them.  
In additional analyses we document that subprime securitizers over-performed the peers before 
the market crash in 2007 while they underperformed other financial institutions once the 
subprime market collapsed. Moreover, subprime securitizers were able to distribute more 
dividends than the other financial institutions. Overall, our results speak to the role of equity and 
risk incentives in motivating CEOs to engage in securitization activities, and show that these 
widely used incentive tools had the consequences of boosting financial transactions that turned 
out to be extremely costly. 
Our contribution, therefore, adds to the large stream of research warning about possible side 
effects of equity compensation and uncovers a determinant of securitization transactions that has 
been overlooked by previous literature.  
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APPENDIX 3. A 
Estimates of a stock option’s sensitivity to stock price are calculated based on the Black-Scholes 
(1973) formula for valuing European call options, as modified to account for dividend payout by 
Merton (1973). 
 
Option Value = [S e-dT N(Z) – Xe –rT N(Z-σT(1/2)] 
 
 
 
Where 
Z = [ln(S/X) + T (r – d + σ2/2]/σT(1/2) 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option 
r = risk-free interest rate 
d = expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price is defined as: 
 
[δ(option value)/ δ(price)*(price/100) = e-dT * N(Z) * (price/100) 
 
 
The sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock price volatility is defined as: 
[δ(option value)/ δ(volatility)]*0.01 = e-dT * N’(Z) * ST1/2*0.01 
 
 
where N’ is the normal density function. 
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APPENDIX 3. B 
Variable Definition 
Securitization  Total amount of financial assets that have been transfered off-balance through securitization, divided by the amount of total loans managed 
Loss Secur Percentage loss on securitized loans  
Diff in Losses  Difference between the percentage credit loss on securitized loans and the percentage of credit loss on withheld loans 
Equity Incentives Logarithm of the dollar change in the value of CEO's stock and option holdings that would come from a one percentage point increase in the company stock price 
Risk Incentives  Vega of CEO’s stock options divided by their Delta 
Log Age  Log transformation of CEO’s age 
B_M  Book value of equity divided by its market value 
Returns  Market annual returns 
Size  Logarithm of total assets 
Change Assets  Percentage change in total assets with respect to the previous year 
Change Tier 1  Percentage change in Tier 1 with respect to the previous year 
Interest Income  Net interest income standardized by total revenues 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
Top Subprime Dummy equal to one if the financial institution is listed as top subprime securitizer in the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual during the period 2000-2007 
Disclosure Index  4-point-scale variable that classifies the quality of information provided by the financial institution about the amount of losses recorded on securitized loans 
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